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Immigration, Sovereignty, and the Constitution of
Foreignness
MATTHEW J. LINDSAY
It is a central premise of modern American immigration law that immigrants, by virtue
of their non-citizenship, are properly subject to an extra-constitutional regulatory
authority that is inherent in national sovereignty and buffered against judicial review. The
Supreme Court first posited this constitutionally exceptional authority, which is commonly
known as the “plenary power doctrine,” in the 1889 Chinese Exclusion Case. There, the
Court reconstructed the federal immigration power from a form of commercial regulation
rooted in Congress’s commerce power, to an instrument of national self-defense against
invading hordes of economically and racially degraded foreigners.
Today, generations after the United States abandoned overtly racist immigration
policies, such as Chinese exclusion and national origins quotas, the Supreme Court
continues to reaffirm Congress and the President’s virtually unchecked authority over the
admission, exclusion, and removal of non-citizens, as though such authority were a logical
concomitant of national sovereignty. Accordingly, modern judicial defenders of the
plenary power doctrine generally turn a blind eye to the indecorous racial reasoning
deployed by its architects. This Article argues that although the language of race and
invasion has been purged from the vocabulary, and perhaps worldview, of most modern
policymakers and judges, the logic of foreign aggression remains indispensible in
accounting for a power unmoored from the Constitution and shielded from judicial
scrutiny.
Throughout the nation’s first century, the Supreme Court found nothing
constitutionally exceptional about a statute that governed foreigners engaged in the
process of immigration. Immigrants’ non-citizenship was incidental to the nature of the
regulatory authority to which they were subject. Non-citizenship became a trigger for
extra-constitutional authority only in the final decades of the nineteenth century, as
Chinese and “new” European migrants alike increasingly became understood as
fundamentally and permanently alien to the national character. This Article demonstrates
that it was precisely this perception of immigrants’ essential, indelible foreignness—their
racial difference, their inability to assimilate, their corrosive effect on American
citizenship—that gave substance to the metaphor of racial invasion, and thus to the
Court’s analogy between immigration regulation and war. The Court’s intemperate
defense of American citizenship against invading foreign races cannot, therefore, be swept
aside as anachronistic dicta cluttering the otherwise logically sound foundation of
immigration exceptionalism; rather, it is the cornerstone of the entire edifice.
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Immigration, Sovereignty, and the Constitution of
Foreignness
MATTHEW J. LINDSAY
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1954, the Supreme Court upheld the deportation of a non-citizen
named Juan Galvan because he had briefly been a member of the
Communist Party decades earlier, at a time when such membership was
neither illegal nor grounds for deportation.1 Galvan had lived in the United
States legally for thirty-six years, had an American wife and four nativeborn American children, and, the evidence showed, had always been “a
good, law-abiding man, a steady worker and a devoted husband and father
loyal to this country and its form of government.”2 Yet for the mere act of
“joining a lawful political group,” Galvan stood to lose “his job, his
friends, his home, and maybe even his children, who must choose between
their father and their native country.”3 Writing for the majority, Justice
Frankfurter acknowledged that because Galvan was a “person” who
“legally became part of the American community,” he should, at least in
theory, be entitled to “the same protection for his life, liberty and property
under the Due Process Clause as is afforded to a citizen.”4 But Galvan’s
status as a non-citizen changed everything. The exclusive entrustment to
Congress of policies bearing on the right of aliens to enter or remain in the
country, Frankfurter explained, “has become about as firmly imbedded in
the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our
government.”5


Assistant Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. M.A. History, University of
Chicago, 1995; J.D. Yale Law School, 2002; Ph.D. History, University of Chicago (expected 2013).
For their valuable insights and criticism, I am grateful to David Jaros, Will Hubbard, Kim Reilly and
Colin Starger. Katie Furlong provided excellent editorial advice.
1
Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 523, 528, 532 (1954). Galvan faced deportation under a
provision of the Internal Security Act of 1950 requiring the Attorney General to deport aliens who had
ever been “members of or affiliated with . . . the Communist Party of the United States.” Internal
Security Act of 1950, Sec. 22 (C), § 1(2), 64 Stat. 987; Galvan, 347 U.S. at 523.
2
Galvan, 347 U.S. at 532–33 (Black, J., dissenting).
3
Id. at 533.
4
Id. at 530. Deportation was “a drastic measure . . . at times the equivalent of banishment or
exile,” Frankfurter acknowledged. Id. (quoting Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)).
Deportation could “deprive a man of ‘all that makes life worth living.’” Id. (quoting Ng Fung Ho v.
White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922)).
5
Id. at 531.
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The modern federal immigration power, which is commonly known as
the “plenary power doctrine,” is defined by two features. First, Congress’s
authority to regulate immigration derives not from any constitutionally
enumerated power, but is rather “an incident of sovereignty belonging to
the government of the United States.”6 Second, federal laws or
enforcement actions that bear on a non-citizen’s right to be present within
the country are buffered against judicially enforceable constitutional
constraints.7 The extent to which governmental authority is
constitutionally constrained is thus contingent on the citizenship status of
the person who is subject to that authority, rather than (as would normally
be the case) the subject-matter or purpose of the regulation involved. This
is true even when the constitutional protection at issue—be it the First
Amendment or the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses—makes no
distinction between “persons” and “citizens.”8 Indeed, even as Justice
Frankfurter upheld Juan Galvan’s deportation, he was struck by “a sense of
harsh incongruity” between the principle that “the Due Process Clause
[normally] qualifies the scope of [Congress’s] political discretion” and the
deportation of a long-term resident alien who was innocent of any wrongdoing.9 Ever since the Supreme Court first adopted the plenary power
doctrine in the 1889 Chinese Exclusion Case,10 it has justified the
“constitutional exceptionalism”11 of American immigration law with
reference to the purportedly intricate connection between the admission
and removal of foreigners and “basic aspects of national sovereignty, more
particularly our foreign relations and the national security.”12 Despite
Justice Frankfurter’s misgivings, the Supreme Court continues to reaffirm
6

Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
For the classic formulation of the plenary power doctrine, see The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130
U.S. at 606−09; Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1891); Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1993).
8
See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 530–31 (2003) (Due Process Clause); Reno v. Am.Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 488, 491–92 (1999) (First Amendment); Mathews v.
Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 86–87 (1976) (Equal Protection Clause).
9
Galvan, 347 U.S. at 530–31.
10
130 U.S. at 604.
11
Scholars and courts alike have long noted and often criticized the constitutionally exceptional
status of the federal immigration power within American public law. See, e.g., GERALD L. NEUMAN,
STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 13 (1996)
(describing the “immigration anomaly” in U.S. constitutional law); LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS
TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW 245 (1995)
(observing that immigration is “alienate[d] . . . from other branches of pubic law”); PETER H. SCHUCK,
CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS: ESSAYS ON IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP 19 (1998)
(characterizing immigration as a legal “maverick” and “wild card”); Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious
Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1704 (1992) (noting the “singularity” of immigration).
12
Galvan, 347 U.S. at 530. See Matthew J. Lindsay, Immigration as Invasion: Sovereignty,
Security, and the Origins of the Federal Immigration Power, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 40 (2010)
for a discussion on the “national security rationale” for immigration exceptionalism.
7
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immigration exceptionalism as though it is a natural, self-evident
consequence of exclusive citizenship and sovereign nationhood.13
This Article challenges the central orthodoxy of modern constitutional
immigration law that the regulatory authority to which an immigrant is
subject properly hinges on her citizenship status. It argues that,
notwithstanding its aura of naturalness, the legal construction of
foreignness that underwrites the inherent sovereignty rationale did not take
shape in its recognizably modern form until the 1880s. Throughout the
nation’s first century, immigrants’ non-citizenship was incidental, or at
least secondary, to the nature of the regulatory authority to which they, as
immigrants, were subject. The reasons for this lie largely outside of the
law. Until the decades following the Civil War, most Americans shared a
broad confidence both in immigrants’ moral natures and in the power of
American economic and political institutions to transform them into
patriotic republicans.14 During this era of relative confidence, the
individual states reserved significant authority over immigrants and
immigration under their traditional police powers. State police authority,
in turn, depended not on immigrants’ status as foreigners, but rather on the
purpose of the particular regulation at issue. As the objects of the state
police power—as potential paupers or carriers of disease, for example—
immigrants were simply persons, whose effect on the health, morals, and
welfare of the community was, like that of all persons, native and foreign
alike, subject to regulation.15 Even after the Supreme Court re-branded
immigrants as articles of commerce in the 1870s to accommodate the
transfer of regulatory authority from the individual states to Congress, it
did not distinguish between human commercial goods transported from a
neighboring state and those transported across an ocean. The Commerce
Clause, like the police power, was indifferent to citizenship.16
Immigrants were legally reconstructed as foreigners only in the final
decades of the nineteenth century, as Europeans and Chinese migrants
alike increasingly became understood as fundamentally and permanently
alien to the American character.17 In the 1870s and 1880s, Americans’
long-standing confidence in the assimilative power of American
institutions came into progressively sharper conflict with the economic and
social realities of industrialization, including the triumph of the wage
system; the deskilling of labor; and increasingly intense wage competition,
13
To be clear, the constitutional “exceptionalism” of the federal immigration power lies not in the
fact that some laws apply only to non-citizens. Indeed, that is an irreducible feature of regulating
immigration. Rather, immigration law is constitutionally exceptional because constitutional scrutiny
varies according to the citizenship status of the persons being regulated.
14
See infra Part III.A.
15
See infra Part III.B.
16
See infra Part IV.B.
17
See infra Part IV.C.
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often from recent immigrants. As contemporaries grappled with this
conflict, they generally focused less on these broad structural economic
changes than on the alleged economic pathologies of immigrants
themselves—specifically, a disposition toward “uncivilized” standards of
life and labor. Without the requisite economic conditions and racial
material, critics argued, simply exposing immigrants to republican political
culture and institutions afforded little value as a force of assimilation. As
post-Civil War Americans re-imagined their polity as a social and political
body, the health of which depended on the collective natural endowments
of its constituent members, immigrants’ foreignness came to signify more
than merely the absence of citizenship; it became, instead, a token of
fundamental, indelible moral difference.18 The Supreme Court then
translated the discourse of indelible foreignness into a potent and durable
rationale for immigration exceptionalism, forging the immigration power
into an instrument of national “self-preservation” to be deployed against
invading armies of economically degraded, politically unassimilable,
racially suspect foreigners.19
Modern judicial defenders of the plenary power doctrine justify the
political branches’ virtually unchecked authority over immigration as a
logical concomitant of national sovereignty and, specifically, of the
President’s authority to conduct foreign affairs and national security.
Accordingly, they generally turn a blind eye to the indecorous references to
racial “degradation” and “alien invasion” that color the doctrine’s
historical origins, as though they were merely anachronistic dicta—the
rhetorical artifacts of a bygone era.20
18

See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part IV.D.
20
See Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003) (“[A]ny policy toward aliens is
vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign
relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government.” (quoting Mathews
v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81, n. 17 (1976) (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588–89
(1952)))); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1976) (“Our cases ‘have long recognized the power to
expel aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments
largely immune from judicial control.’” (quoting Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1952)));
see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that judicial
interference with the executive branch’s judgment to detain a removable alien threatens to “undermine
the obvious necessity that the Nation speak with one voice on . . . foreign affairs matters”). As the
citations above suggest, modern judicial affirmations of the political branches’ plenary power over
immigration tend to rely directly on a series of cases from the 1950s, in which the Supreme Court
upheld the exclusion or deportation of aliens on political or ideological grounds in the interest of
“national security.” Foundational late nineteenth-century cases such as The Chinese Exclusion Case
and Fong Yue Ting are sometimes buried in a string citation, but virtually never quoted directly. The
effect is to launder the racially inflected construction of national “sovereignty” and “security” that
characterized the birth of the plenary power doctrine through cases that do have a colorable connection
to national security (as the concept is currently understood) and that lack the doctrine’s original
association with racially discriminatory immigration policy.
19
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This Article demonstrates, to the contrary, that it was precisely the
construction of immigrants as indelibly alien to the national character that
gave substance to the metaphor of invasion, and thus enabled the Supreme
Court to transform the immigration power from a species of commercial
regulation to a power “inherent in sovereignty, . . . essential to selfpreservation,” and “conclusive upon the judiciary.”21 As much as the
tropes of racial degradation and alien invasion have been purged from the
vocabulary, and perhaps worldview, of most modern legislators and
judges, the association between immigration regulation and national
security remains essential to justifying a power unmoored from the
Constitution and shielded from judicial scrutiny.
It is a staple of immigration law scholarship that the racial construction
of various immigrant groups, coupled with Americans’ waning faith in
assimilation, gave rise to restrictive immigration policy, beginning with the
Chinese Exclusion Act22 in the 1880s and ultimately culminating with the
national origins quota system in the 1920s.23 Indeed, Americans’ impulse
to defend the nation’s political integrity against corruption by racial others
dates to the Naturalization Act of 1790, which restricted access to United
States citizenship to “free white persons.”24 This Article contends that the
erosion of confidence in both the assimilative power of republican
institutions and the plasticity of immigrants’ moral natures also propelled a
deeper and more enduring process of constitutional estrangement,
fundamentally redefining the very authority to which immigrants were
subject. Even today, generations after the United States abandoned nativist
immigration policy,25 immigrants’ anomalous constitutional status remains
Regardless of presidential administration, the executive branch routinely invokes national
sovereignty, foreign affairs, and national security in support of a robust federal immigration power.
See, e.g., Brief of Respondent at 25, Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (No. 99-2071) (arguing that
judicial deference to the political branches in immigration matters “affords Congress the practical
latitude it needs to fulfill its responsibilities for national security, foreign affairs, and nation-building”);
Brief of Respondents at 17, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11-182) (arguing
that the federal government possesses exclusive authority to regulate immigration because “the United
States’ ‘policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with . . . the conduct of foreign
relations’” (quoting Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 588–89)).
21
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705–06 (1893).
22
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882).
23
Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153, 155 (1924); see SCHUCK, supra note 11, at 28
(discussing the quota system); ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF
CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 357–61 (1997) (discussing Chinese exclusion in the 1880s); DANIEL J.
TICHENOR, DIVIDING LINES: THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION CONTROL IN AMERICA 142–43 (2002)
(discussing the quota system); ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN: IMMIGRATION POLICY IN
THE FASHIONING OF AMERICA 243–45 (2006) (discussing the post-World War I effort to curb
immigration).
24
Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, repealed by Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, 1 Stat.
414.
25
This liberalization includes, most notably, the abolition of national origins quotas in the
Immigration Act of 1965. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965).
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an axiomatic feature of the federal immigration power. As a result, even
non-citizens who, like Juan Galvan, have resided legally in the United
States for decades lack robust constitutional protections against, for
example, improper detention during often lengthy removal proceedings;27
selection for removal because of otherwise constitutionally protected
speech or associations;28 or discrimination on the basis of alienage with
respect to eligibility for public benefits.29
Part II of this Article describes the basic ideological framework within
which Americans understood and debated immigration law and policy
throughout the nineteenth century. It demonstrates that the first generation
of American statesmen imagined the very act of immigrating to and
incorporating oneself within republican America as a catalyst for personal
moral and political regeneration. This confidence in the assimilative
power of republican cultural and institutions, in turn, was reflected in the
relative liberality of the nation’s naturalization laws.30 Part III analyzes the
history of immigration law and politics in the nineteenth-century United
States as a history of repeated and progressively sharper clashes between
the terms of the regenerative model of immigration and the seismic social
and economic transformations of the industrial era. It demonstrates that
throughout the nation’s first century—a period characterized by broad, if
uneven, confidence in assimilation—the absence of citizenship did not
operate as a presumptively natural, self-evident marker of legal difference.
Rather, the Supreme Court, like most Americans, understood the problems
associated with immigration to be local and discrete. As such, their
regulation fit comfortably within the province of the states’ traditional
police authority, which figured immigrants simply as persons, rather than
foreigners.31
Part IV analyzes the federalization of immigration regulation during
the last third of the nineteenth century. When the Supreme Court
transferred regulatory authority from the individual states to Congress in
26
As the Supreme Court said recently, it is a fundamental premise of constitutional immigration
law that, in “the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly
makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 521
(2003) (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79–80 (1976)).
27
See id. (upholding mandatory detention of certain “deportable criminal aliens pending a
determination of their removability” under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2012)).
28
See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 472–74 (1999) (upholding
selection of aliens for deportation on the grounds that they were associated with the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine).
29
See Mathews, 426 U.S. at 80 (upholding state welfare eligibility rules disfavoring non-citizens).
Non-citizens denied entry at the border enjoy no judicially enforceable constitutional protection. See
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (“Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is,
it is due process.”).
30
See infra Part II.
31
See infra Part III.
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the 1870s, it recharacterized immigrants as articles of commerce. Yet the
federal commerce power, like the state police power, was indifferent to
citizenship. The national economic importance of immigration, for better
and worse, defined the nature and scope of congressional authority; it
mattered not whether the human cargo was transported from a neighboring
state or across the ocean. 33 Even as the Court was anchoring federal
authority in the Commerce Clause, however, a swelling chorus of
legislators, workers, economists, and others were condemning the
degradation of American labor and citizenship by Chinese “coolies” in the
American West and European “foreign pauper laborers” in the Northeast. 34
It was this critique that propelled both the legal reconstruction of
foreignness and the Court’s discovery of an extra-constitutional regulatory
authority that was inherent in the nation’s sovereignty and essential to its
“self-preservation.”35 The Article concludes, in Part V, by considering
how this historical genealogy challenges the central orthodoxy of modern
constitutional immigration law.
II. AWAKENING THE “DORMANT SEED OF VIRTUE”: IMMIGRATION AS
REGENERATION IN REPUBLICAN AMERICA
As the first American Congress took up its constitutional charge to
“establish a[] uniform Rule of Naturalization,”36 it confronted a basic
conflict between two fundamental but potentially incompatible aspirations:
the creation of a national political fellowship sustained by the broadly
shared republican value of “public virtue,” and the revolutionary ideal of
the American republic as an “asylum of liberty” and a refuge to the victims
of Old World oppression. This Part describes how the first generation of
American statesmen resolved, or at least accommodated, these competing
aspirations. They did so, in short, by imagining the very act of
immigrating to and incorporating oneself within republican America as a
catalyst for personal moral and political regeneration. Under this narrative
of immigration as regeneration, the economic opportunities afforded by a
32
Mary Sarah Bilder, The Struggle Over Immigration: Indentured Servants, Slaves, and Articles
of Commerce, 61 MO. L. REV. 743, 819 (1996).
33
See infra Part IV.B.
34
See infra Part IV.C.
35
See infra Part IV.D.
36
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. The early congressional debates that shaped the nation’s political
posture toward immigration centered not on the creation of “immigration policy” per se, understood as
the rules governing admission to U.S. territory (e.g., the number of immigrants that should be admitted
to the country, appropriate criteria for admission, and specific conditions of continued residence), but
rather the admission of foreigners to American citizenship. To the extent that there existed a national
“immigration policy” in the 1780s and 1790s, it was largely one of non-intervention, as Congress
consistently rejected calls either to deny entry to “undesirable” immigrants, or to offer special
inducements, such as subsidies and free land, to would-be migrants. See MARILYN C. BASELER,
“ASYLUM FOR MANKIND”: AMERICA 1607–1800, 195–98 (1998).
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open continent and easy access to land, coupled with immersion in
republican political culture and institutions, would transform the vast
majority of European immigrants into patriotic American citizens. This
narrative provided the basic framework within which Americans would
understand and debate immigration for the next century, and is essential to
understanding why, in the final third of the nineteenth century, immigrants
became strangers to the Constitution.
A. The Republican Paradox: The Ideal of Asylum in a Heterogeneous
World
The narrative of immigration as regeneration was deeply embedded in
the ideology of republicanism that infused the political culture of the
American revolutionary generation.
For devoted republicans, the
revolution had accomplished more than political independence from
England; it had also effected a wholesale transformation in the nature of
political authority, the character of society, and the spirit of the people.37
Republicans viewed politics as the collective pursuit of a transcendent
“public good.”38 The people’s representatives would govern not as
advocates for the “partial” interests of individuals or political factions, but
as disinterested servants of the entire polity.39 This collective submersion
of private and factional interests required extraordinary moral character on
the part of the people and their representatives. Republicans termed such
character “public virtue,” and it was the soul and lifeblood of
republicanism.40
Republicans staked the people’s capacity for public virtue to a model
of disinterested, independent citizenship that could be achieved only
through economic self-sufficiency. In the republican worldview, men who
labored for a wage at the behest of another not only surrendered their
economic independence; they subjected their personal autonomy and
political will to the authority of their employer.41 True political
independence, and thus the capacity for public virtue, could only be

37
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787 47–48 (1969)
[hereinafter WOOD, AMERICAN REPUBLIC] (“Republicanism meant more for Americans than simply the
elimination of a king and the institution of an elective system. It added a moral dimension, a utopian
depth, to the political separation from England—a depth that involved the very character of their
society.”).
38
Id. at 53–55.
39
Id. at 53–59.
40
Id. at 68.
41
See DREW R. MCCOY, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN JEFFERSONIAN
AMERICA 37–38, 118–19 (1980); AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR,
MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 9–10 (1998).
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achieved through the ownership of real property.
Accordingly,
Jeffersonians of the 1790s sought to preserve the United States as a
predominantly agrarian republic of small, independent producer-citizens,
and to forestall the emergence of a class of permanent wage workers who
would be too preoccupied with the struggle for subsistence and too
dependent on their employers to concern themselves with the public
good.43 Jeffersonians thus viewed Alexander Hamilton’s program to
promote domestic manufactures as a path not to American progress and
prosperity, but to the kind of mass economic dependency, class hierarchy,
and political subordination that plagued the manufacturing societies of
Europe.44 Indeed, the perpetual agrarianism of the United States, and the
personal independence and citizenly virtue that flowed from and sustained
it, defined the uniqueness of the American republic.45
If faith in the moral character and shared values of the people marked
the greatness and beauty of the republican vision, however, even its most
ardent partisans recognized that it was, as historian Gordon Wood has
noted, “a fragile beauty indeed.”46 The distinctive emphasis on public
virtue rooted in collective individual moral character counseled caution
toward immigrants who might “bring with them the principles of the
governments they leave,” as Thomas Jefferson famously warned in 1782.47
Refugees from European oppression would transmit “the maxims of
42
See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 178 (1991);
Ruth H. Bloch, The Gendered Meanings of Virtue in Revolutionary America, 13 SIGNS 37, 40–41
(1987).
43
See MCCOY, supra note 41, at 109–12.
44
Id. at 14–15.
45
This republican exceptionalism came into sharpest focus in contrast to the dual political and
economic oppressions of the Old World. In the most widely read tract on America during the 1780s in
Europe and Great Britain, essayist Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur captured the crux of the republican
vision from the perspective of a newly landed immigrant:

He is arrived on a new continent . . . . It is not composed, as in Europe, of great lords
who possess everything and of a herd of people who have nothing. Here there are
no aristocratical families, no courts, no kings, no bishops, no ecclesiastical
dominion, no invisible power giving to a few a very visible one, no great
manufacturers employing thousands, no great refinements of luxury. . . . We are a
people of cultivators, scattered over an immense territory, . . . united by the silken
bands of mild government, all respecting the laws without dreading their power,
because they are equitable. We are all animated with the spirit of an industry which
is unfettered and unrestrained, because each person works for himself.
Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur, What Is an American?, in LETTERS FROM AN AMERICAN
FARMER AND SKETCHES OF EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 66, 67 (Albert E. Stone ed.,
Penguin Books 1981).
46
WOOD, AMERICAN REPUBLIC, supra note 37, at 65–66.
47
THOMAS JEFFERSON, Notes on Virginia, in THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 187, 218 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., 1944). This was true of many future
Jeffersonians and Federalists alike, as the partisan division that would soon come to dominate
immigration and naturalization policy (and American politics generally) had not yet coalesced in the
1780s and early 1790s.
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absolute monarchies” to their children, who would “infuse into [our
legislation] their spirit, warp and bias its direction, and render it a
heterogeneous, incoherent, distracted mass.”48 If the Republic were to
“wait with patience” for its current population to grow naturally, rather
than inviting foreigners by “extraordinary encouragements,” Jefferson
queried, “[m]ay not our government be more homogeneous, more
peaceable, more durable?”49
This republican commitment to a “homogeneous” national political
fellowship sustained by a common pursuit of public virtue coexisted
uncomfortably with a second core revolutionary ideal: that of the United
States as an “asylum of liberty” and a refuge to the victims of Old World
oppression.50 Indeed, the American Declaration of Independence, and thus
the political legitimacy of the American states, was premised on the right
of the people to withdraw their allegiance to their countries of birth.
Having thus defined their political revolution as a crusade for human
freedom, to now prevent the victims of European tyranny from sharing in
the blessings of republican liberty would be a repudiation of the nation’s
founding principles.51 In the 1780s and early 1790s, moreover, that ideal
meshed almost seamlessly with the mercantilist worldview of the
Hamiltonians, under which the acquisition of valuable human capital was a
vital arena of international economic competition and the cornerstone of
Id. at 217–18. Because “[c]ivil government . . . must be conducted by common consent,”
Jefferson explained, the political values of those who unite to form civil government must “harmonize
as much as possible.” Id. at 217. At the 1787 Constitutional Convention, Pierce Butler, South
Carolina’s future United States Senator and himself a former immigrant, declared himself “decidely
[sic] opposed to the admission of foreigners without a long residence in the Country” because they
brought with them “not only attachments to other Countries; but ideas of Govt. so distinct from ours
that in every point of view they are dangerous.” 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787 236 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
49
JEFFERSON, supra note 47, at 218. Jefferson thus contested the “present desire of America . . .
to produce rapid population by as great importations of foreigners as possible.” Id. at 216. Nor were
such sentiments limited to Jeffersonians. In response to a 1790 proposal “to let aliens come in, take the
oath, and hold lands without any residence at all,” Massachusetts Federalist and future Speaker of the
House Theodore Sedgwick denounced the “indiscriminate admission of foreigners to the highest rights
of human nature, upon terms so incompetent to secure the society from being overrun with the outcasts
of Europe.” 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1109, 1117 (1790) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). “[T]heir sensations,
impregnated with prejudices of education, acquired under monarchical and aristocratical
Governments,” he warned, “may deprive them of that zest for pure republicanism, which is necessary
in order to taste its beneficence with that gratitude which we feel.” Id.
50
JEFFERSON, supra note 47, at 218; BASELER, supra note 36, at 191.
51
BASELER, supra note 36, at 13. In the years since independence from Great Britain, insisted
fellow Republican John Swanwick,
48

it had uniformly been the language of this country that we had in the Western world
opened an asylum for emigrants from every country. This was our language: “Come
and join us in the blessing we enjoy, in a country large and fertile, and under a
Government founded upon the principles of liberty and justice.”
7 ANNALS OF CONG. 423 (1797).
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52

national power and prosperity.
As Hamilton explained in 1791, by
providing “every possible avenue to emigration from abroad,”53 the United
States would accomplish the dual goals of “opening an asylum to those
who suffer”54 under Europe’s monarchies and enhancing the young
nation’s wealth and security by populating the vast, fertile continent with
“ingenious and valuable workmen.”55
The first generation of American statesmen ultimately mediated these
competing postures toward immigration by staking the assimilation of
Europe’s outcasts to the unique regenerative power of republican society.
The immersion of foreigners in republican political culture, including their
liberal naturalization, would transform a motley mass of Old World
subjects harboring diverse moral and political constitutions into publicminded, patriotic Americans. Upon arriving in “this great American
asylum,” testified the essayist Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, immigrants
underwent a personal “metamorphosis.”56 The capacity to acquire lands
and thus become “freemen,” protected by “indulgent laws” that “stamp[]
on them the symbol of adoption,” will “tend[] to regenerate them,”57
Crevecoeur explained. Although some statesmen urged the removal of
virtually all barriers to American citizenship,58 for most lawmakers this
52

See ZOLBERG, supra note 23, at 70.
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY OF THE UNITED
STATES ON THE SUBJECT OF MANUFACTURES 24 (1791).
54
Id. at 74.
55
Id. at 40. Federalist members of Congress, in particular, shared Hamilton’s goals. During
debate over the Naturalization Act of 1790, for example, New York Federalist John Laurance explained
his proposal to eliminate any residency requirement for naturalization. “The reason of admitting
foreigners to the rights of citizenship,” he explained, “is the encouragement of emigration, as we have a
large tract of country to people.” 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1111 (1790) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). “[E]very
person, rich or poor,” Laurance declared, “must add to our wealth and strength.” Id. at 1115. On the
mercantilist approach to immigration, see BASELER, supra note 36, at 17–18, 152–55, 227–28;
ZOLBERG, supra note 23, at 69–72.
56
Crèvecoeur, supra note 45, at 68–69.
57
Id. The sooner would-be citizens were incorporated into the American political body, urged
leading Federalist Tench Coxe, “[t]he sooner they become useful members; they then grow attached to
their new country: they consider themselves as part of it: they adopt the opinions and affections of their
new brethren, and soon forget they have adopted them, and imagine they are natural.” Tench Coxe, An
enquiry into the best means of encouraging emigration from abroad, consistently with the happiness
and safety of the original citizens; read before the society for political enquiries, at the house of Dr.
Franklin, April 20 1787, in 10 THE AMERICAN MUSEUM, OR, UNIVERSAL MAGAZINE 114, 115 (1791).
During congressional debate over the residency requirement for naturalization, for example,
Pennsylvanian John Smilie rejected the suggestion that “foreigners, by interfering in our present
political system, will injure or destroy it.” 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 573 (1803). A long period of
residency was unnecessary, he urged, because “[f]oreigners . . . will soon be merged with ourselves,
and instead of introducing among us their sentiments, will soon take up ours.” Id.
58
The most idealistic lawmakers urged that any impediment to the American political fellowship
was inconsistent with the young nation’s professed ideals. In opposing a modest two-year residency
requirement for naturalization, Representative John Page explained that “we shall be inconsistent with
ourselves, if, after boasting of having opened an asylum for the oppressed of all nations, and
53
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regeneration was neither instantaneous nor universal. In crafting a
naturalization law, prudence thus counseled that immigrants undergo a
period of probation before being admitted to the American political
fellowship, both to provide foreigners sufficient time to absorb republican
values, and to afford the nation an opportunity to assess their moral and
political character. After a decade of extraordinary fluctuation in the
requirements for naturalization,59 from a mere two-year residency in the
Naturalization Act of 179060 to a high of fourteen years in 1798,61
Congress settled on a residency requirement of five years—longer than
some idealistic advocates of the American asylum had preferred, but still
remarkably liberal by historical and international standards.62 A five-year
residency “occasioned the safest and surest transmutation,” explained

established a Government which is the admiration of the world, we make the terms of admission to the
full enjoyment of that asylum so hard as is now proposed.” 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1110 (1790) (Joseph
Gales ed., 1834).
59
This fluctuation was the product of the politically volatile, intensely partisan 1790s, during
which the two political parties essentially reversed their respective postures toward immigration.
Federalists, most of whom began the 1790s advocating the aggressive recruitment of foreign
immigrants and their liberal admission to citizenship, had by 1798 adopted a highly defensive position
on naturalization. Those who would become Jeffersonian Republicans, by contrast, managed to
assuage their earlier concern over the anti-republican political values imbibed by Europe’s refugees,
and became vocal advocates for the ideal of the United States as an asylum for liberty. BASELER, supra
note 36, at 243–44. During this period, relatively liberal requirements for naturalization, including a
short (or even no) residency requirement and a low (or no) tax on naturalization certificates were
widely understood both as inducements to immigration and as a fulfillment of the republic’s worldhistorical mission to serve as an asylum for the oppressed. More onerous requirements, including
longer residency and a substantial tax on naturalization certificates, were believed to check the flow of
immigration and to guarantee a measure of fitness on the part of those seeking admission to the
American political fellowship. See id. at 243–309.
60
Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, repealed by Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, 1 Stat.
414.
61
Naturalization Act of 1798, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566, repealed by Act of Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, § 5, 2
Stat. 153.
62
Naturalization Act of 1802, ch. 28, 2 Stat. 153. Thomas Jefferson’s first message to Congress
as President, in December of 1801, captures the extent to which Republicans had picked up the mantle
of liberal asylum. Having famously worried two decades earlier that immigrants tainted by the
“maxims of absolute monarchies” would destroy American law and politics, “render[ing] it a
heterogeneous, incoherent, distracted mass,” THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA
93 (1853), President Jefferson now recommended that, in the interest of human freedom and economic
prosperity, Congress reduce the fourteen-year residency requirement imposed by his Federalist foes
five years earlier:
Considering the ordinary chances of human life, a denial of citizenship under a
residence of fourteen years, is a denial to a great proportion of those who ask it; and
controls a policy pursued, from their first settlement, by many of these States, and
still believed of consequences to their prosperity. And shall we refuse to the
unhappy fugitives from distress that hospitality which the savages of the wilderness
extended to our fathers arriving in this land? Shall oppressed humanity find no
asylum on this globe?
11 ANNALS OF CONG. 16 (1801).
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Pennsylvanian Republican Michael Leib. It would impart “knowledge
and feeling,” and furnish an “opportunity[] for the intercourse that
amalgamated the aliens with us, and gave them a common interest.”64
The relative liberality of the 1802 Act65 cemented the regenerative
theory of immigration as the law of the land, and reflected the delicate,
self-conscious balance between the republican ideal of liberal asylum and
the republican apprehension toward political heterogeneity.
This
confidence in the regenerative power of republican political culture rested
on a deep faith in human moral nature. Even the “most vicious in one
country, . . . being separated from their former connexions, and entering
into new ones, of a better cast,” instructed the theologian, scientist and
political philosopher Joseph Priestley, “may become reformed and useful
citizens. Our natures being the same, . . . [s]easonable kindness may
awaken the dormant seed of virtue, especially in a country like this.”66 In
contrast to Jefferson’s notably darker appraisal two decades earlier, one’s
moral and political constitution was not stamped indelibly by the
influences of his youth. Rather, as Priestley’s formulation suggests, Old
World immigrants—even those who had imbibed the maxims of
monarchy—could be reeducated in the principles and spirit of
republicanism. Republicans were not born; rather, they were made.
The narrative of regeneration reflected lawmakers’ hopes and fears
regarding not only immigration, but the American republic itself. It
evinced a certain optimistic, almost self-congratulatory confidence that the
transformative power of geography and political institutions would
preserve for all time the core republican values of personal independence
and citizenly virtue. Below the surface, however, lurked the same dangers
that threatened virtuous citizenship generally: concentrations of population,
a permanent class of “dependent” laborers, and entrenched social and
political stratification. As went immigration, so went the Republic.
Indeed, in the coming decades, the perceived viability of the regenerative
theory of immigration would, in certain respects, serve as a referendum on
the vitality of American republicanism itself. Thus freighted with the
63

63

12 ANNALS OF CONG. 576 (1803).
Id. A period of residency, Leib insisted, rather than a mere oath of allegiance, provided “the
surest standard by which to test the desire for citizenship; it was action, and not declaration; it was fact
and not theory.” Id.
65
See generally ZOLBERG, supra note 23, at 78–98. The 1802 Act also retained other
prerequisites for naturalization imposed by Federalists several years earlier that were intended to
constrain aliens’ political influence and ensure that they gained a proper attachment to the United States
and its government. These included requirements that an alien swear an oath three years prior to
naturalization declaring her intention to become an American citizen; renounce her allegiance to any
foreign sovereign; and register with a court upon initial arrival in the United States. Naturalization Act
of 1802, ch. 28, 2 Stat. 153.
66
Joseph Priestley, “A Charity Sermon for Poor Emigrants,” in HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF THE
IMMIGRATION PROBLEM 708, 711 (Edith Abbott ed., 1926).
64
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weight of the American Republic, this amalgam of strength and
vulnerability established the terms in which legislators, judges, workers,
economists, and political intellectuals would give meaning to immigrants
and immigration for the next century.
B. Aliens, Persons, and Regulatory Authority in the Early Republic:
The Alien Friends Act of 1798
The Constitution charges Congress with establishing a uniform rule of
naturalization,67 but it is otherwise silent regarding either the authority to
regulate immigration or the constitutional rights of immigrants. The first
and only sustained analysis of those issues during the Founding Era came
in the politically heated, intensely partisan debate over the Alien Friends
Act of 1798.68 The Act authorized the President to order the removal of
any alien, regardless of country of origin, that he judged “dangerous to the
peace and safety of the United States,” or had “reasonable grounds” to
suspect was engaged in treason or “secret machinations” against its
government.69 Congressional debate between the Act’s Federalist sponsors
and its Republican opponents revealed the great extent to which the
question of whether aliens had constitutional rights was intertwined with
the question of whether the authority to regulate immigration resided with
the federal government or the states.
The Alien Friends Act was a key component of the infamous Alien and
Sedition Acts, and the most brazen statutory expression of the anti-alien
frenzy stoked by Federalists in the closing years of the eighteenth
century.70 In defense of the Act, Federalists argued, first, that
67

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
It was so designated in order to distinguish it from the Alien Enemies Act, which was part of
the same package of legislation and applied only to subjects of nations with which the United States
was at war. Alien Enemies Act, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 21 (2006)).
69
Alien Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 571 (1798).
70
During the so-called “quasi-war” with France, and amidst mounting apprehensions about the
growing radicalism of the French Revolution, French conspiracies against American liberty, and the
infection of American politics by European Jacobinism, Federalists admonished the nation, to great
short-term partisan political benefit, that the tree of republican liberty would be devoured root and
branch by alien enemies who had infiltrated the American polity. See BASELER, supra note 36, at 272.
The “quasi-war” included the severing of diplomatic relations between the countries as well as actual
naval combat. ALEXANDER DECONDE, THE QUASI-WAR: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF THE
UNDECLARED WAR WITH FRANCE 1797–1801 126–30 (1966); Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in
Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over
Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 87–92 (2002). In the months preceding the Alien and Sedition
Acts, Federalists in Congress had exploited the nation’s nativist mood to adopt two measures that were
widely understood to discourage immigration—first, to lay a heavy (twenty dollar) tax on
naturalization certificates, and second, to nearly triple the residency requirement for admission to
American citizenship, from five to fourteen years. See 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 423 (1797) (discussing the
tax); Naturalization Act of 1798, ch. 54, § 1, 1 Stat. 566, repealed by Act of Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, § 5.
Debate over the Alien Friends Act, including both initial passage of the law and subsequent efforts to
68
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congressional—and, by delegation, presidential—authority to remove at
will politically suspect foreigners was rooted in Congress’s constitutional
power to defend the nation against foreign invasion; and second, that aliens
were not entitled to constitutional protections against summary removal
because they were not “parties” to the Constitution.71 Although the Act’s
narrow passage marked a short-term legislative victory for Federalists in
Congress, the Act proved wildly unpopular among the American public,
and contributed to the Republican electoral triumph in 1800 and the
subsequent demise of the Federalist Party.72 In fact, the constitutional
arguments advanced by Republicans in opposition to expansive federal
authority over immigration better reflected mainstream political and legal
opinion both at the time and in subsequent decades.73 After briefly
describing the Federalist argument in support of the Alien Friends Act, this
Section therefore turns its focus to the constitutional arguments developed
by the Act’s Republican opponents.
Both supporters and critics of the Act recognized that it granted to the
President extraordinary discretionary power. In rebuttal to Republican
charges that the Act usurped the rightful, inherent authority of the states to
regulate the presence of foreigners within their territory, Federalists lodged
the constitutional power to expel foreigners squarely in Congress’s duty of
national self-defense.74 The Constitution was designed to “embrace all our
exterior relations,” explained Massachusetts Federalist Harrison Gray Otis,
the leading congressional critic of liberal immigration policies.75 “The
great objects of peace and war, negotiations with foreign countries, the
repeal it, spanned two sessions of Congress and spilled into the Virginia and Kentucky legislatures,
which adopted resolutions drafted by James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, respectively, forcefully
denouncing the Act on constitutional grounds. See THE VIRGINIA REPORT OF 1799–1800, TOUCHING
THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS; TOGETHER WITH THE VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS OF DECEMBER 21,
1798 22–23, 162–67 (1850).
71
See 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2987 (1799) (“[T]he Constitution was made for citizens, not for
aliens, who of consequence have no rights under it.”).
72
As the historian Marilyn Baseler writes, “[t]he election of 1800 was a referendum on—and a
repudiation of—the Federalist ‘doctrines’ enunciated in the debates” over, among other things, the
Alien Friends and Naturalization Acts of 1798. BASELER, supra note 36, at 287.
73
As Baseler explains, “Subsequent Republican victories in the early nineteenth century validated
their principles and vision for the future of the United States, whereas the Federalist principles and
pronouncements of the late 1790s were increasingly seen as archaic holdovers or temporary aberrations
induced by ‘wartime’ hysteria.” Id. at 288.
74
A House Report assessing the constitutionality of the Alien Friends Act explained:
The right of removing aliens, as an incident to the power of war and peace,
according to the theory of the Constitution, belongs to the Government of the United
States. . . . Congress is required to protect each State from invasion, and is vested . . .
with [the] power to . . . remove from the country, in times of hostility, dangerous
aliens, who may be employed in preparing the way for invasion.
9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2986 (1799). The Act’s principle congressional advocates echoed this rationale.
75
8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1986 (1798).
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general peace and welfare of the United States,” Otis maintained, “must be
provided for and maintained by the National Government.”76 State
authority must therefore “vanish before the obligation of the General
Government to provide for the common defence.”77 An exceptional,
imminent foreign threat to the nation’s security warranted a
constitutionally extraordinary power to expel foreigners.78
Federalists simultaneously denied that aliens even possessed the
constitutional criminal rights that the Act was alleged to abridge, including
the right to an indictment, to trial by jury, and to confront witnesses against
them. “[T]he asylum given by a nation to foreigners [was] a mere matter
of favor”79 rooted in the government’s policy of “courtesy and
humanity,”80 Otis maintained, rather than in any “claim [of] equal rights.”81
He found nothing in the Constitution “which bound us to fraternize with
the whole world,” and condemned Republicans’ “very erroneous
hypothesis, that aliens are parties to our Constitution, that it was made for
their benefit as well as our own and that they may claim equal rights and
privileges with our own citizens.”82
If the adoption of the Alien Friends Act represented a dramatic shortterm political triumph for the Federalist Party, however, it proved virtually
inconsequential as a matter of national policy.83 The long-term importance
of the Act lay instead in the galvanizing effect that it had on Republicans,
spurring them to develop competing, and ultimately much more influential,
accounts of the constitutional status of immigrants and governmental
authority over immigration. Republican House leaders Edward Livingston
of New York and Albert Gallatin of Pennsylvania spearheaded the
opposition to the Act. They refuted at length the dual Federalist
contentions that foreigners lacked constitutional rights, and that the
Constitution permitted the federal Congress and President to usurp the
76

Id. at 1986.
Id. Otis continued: “[N]o other authority is competent to these great duties; no other can judge
of the necessity of measures preparatory to the national defence, nor enforce such measures with
general effect.” Id.
78
See, e.g., 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1987 (1798) (“If we find men in this country endeavoring to
spread sedition and discord; who have assisted in laying other countries prostrate; whose hands are
reeking with blood, and whose hearts rankle with hatred towards us—have we not the power to shake
off these firebrands?”); id. at 1992 (“Are we to wait . . . until the dagger is plunged into our bosoms,
before we take any means of defence?”).
79
Id. at 2986.
80
Id. at 2019; see also id. at 1983 (stating that the United States’s authority “to withdraw their
protection to aliens . . . is bounded only by sound discretion”).
81
Id. at 2018.
82
Id. (“[U]pon reading the Constitution, [Otis] found that ‘we, the people of the United States,’
were the only parties concerned in making that instrument. . . . [U]ntil [foreigners are] entitled [to
American citizenship,] they cannot complain of any breach of our Constitution.”).
83
The Act expired by its own terms after two years, in 1800, and no alien was ever deported
under the Act. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE
SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 33 (2004); ZOLBERG, supra note 23, at 310.
77
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authority of the states to regulate immigration. Republicans rejected the
argument made by Otis and others that “the Constitutional compact was
made between citizens only, and that, therefore, its provisions were not
intended to extend to aliens.”85 “[T]he Constitution expressly excludes any
. . . distinction between citizen and alien,” Livingston maintained, and it
was “an acknowledged principle of the common law . . . that alien friends
. . . residing among us, are entitled to the protection of our laws.”86
Citizens and aliens alike thus enjoyed “the same equal distribution of
justice [and] . . . the same humane provision to protect their innocence.”87
So indistinguishable was the constitutional status of aliens and citizens,
Livingston warned, that the same rationale for subjecting “a few
unprotected aliens” to the Act’s “inquisitorial power” would “apply with
equal strength . . . in the case of citizens.”88 The same “plea of necessity,”
he warned, could justify the banishment of both.89
Republicans condemned the bill as a frontal assault on the
Constitution—a “sacrifice of the first-born offspring of freedom . . . by
those who gave it birth”90—that violated the fundamental tenets of both
separation of powers and federalism. By withholding constitutional
criminal rights from the “accused,” and vesting the unchecked discretion to
judge “dangerousness” in the person of the President, critics charged, the
Act transferred judicial power from the courts to the Executive.91 The
effect was to “confound these fundamental powers of Government, vest
them all in . . . unqualified terms in one hand, and thus subvert the basis on
which our liberties rest.”92
Republicans voiced even greater concern, however, over Congress’s
invocation of its constitutional authority to wage war and repel invasion.
“[I]nstead of being bound by a Constitution,” a Congress acting under a
84

Infra notes 86–101 and accompanying text.
Id. at 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2012 (1798).
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 2013.
89
Id. By the terms of the Constitution, Livingston continued,
85

“all crimes” are to be tried by jury; “no person” shall be held to answer unless on
presentment; in all “criminal prosecutions” the “accused” is to be informed of the
nature of the charge; to be confronted with the witness against him; . . . and is to be
allowed counsel for his defence. Unless, therefore, we can believe that the
treasonable machinations and the other offenses described in the bill are not
“crimes;” that an alien is not a “person;” and that one charged with treasonable
practices is not “accused” . . . we must allow that all these provisions extend equally
to aliens and natives, and that the citizen has no other security for his personal safety
than is extended to the stranger who is within his gates.
Id.
90

Id. at 2015.
Id. at 1013–15.
92
Id. at 2007–08.
91
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virtually unrestrained war power could “justify any measure [it] may
please to adopt,” though in fact impelled by mere “suspicions, alarms,
popular clamor, private ambition, and by the views of fluctuating
factions.”93 As a consequence, “all the reserved powers of the people or of
the States will be swallowed up at [Congress’s] pleasure by that undefined
discretion.”94 Because “[t]he Constitution gives to Congress no power
over aliens, except that of naturalization,” Republicans maintained, the
power “remains with the States to give to aliens the rights of denizens.”95
Several representatives recalled that the Declaration of Independence
included in its list of grievances the British Crown’s hindering of foreign
immigration to the American colonies.96 Notably, even Federalist
supporters of the Act conceded that under normal circumstances “the
power of admitting foreigners . . . remained with the states.”97
And indeed, Republicans noted that state legislatures had long acted on
the presumption that the individual states had “reserved to themselves the
power of regulating what relates to emigrants.”98 That presumption,
moreover, was rooted in the fundamentally local nature of immigration
policymaking, shaped, as it was, by the specific demographic and
economic circumstances within each state.
While “States whose
population is full, and to which few migrations take place, are little
concerned” with the bill’s potential to discourage immigration, urged
Gallatin, it was of great “consequence . . . to those States whose population
is thin, and whose policy it has always been to encourage emigration.”99
By way of illustration, Republicans cited various laws that had been passed
by their respective state legislatures “for the express encouragement of
emigration.”100 “Not only in some States have aliens been enabled to
purchase, to hold, to inherit, and to leave by will, real estates,” Gallatin
recounted, “but many have actually been admitted in some States . . . to all

93

9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2996 (1799) (statement of Rep. Gallatin).
Id.
95
Id. at 2000. Gallatin acknowledged that “Congress has the power to declare war, and to punish
any persons guilty of treasonable practices,” but insisted that “what relates to aliens as suspicious
characters, the Government of the United States has no cognizance of.” 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1977
(1798).
96
See, e.g., 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2023 (1799) (statement of Rep. Smith); id. at 1983 (statement of
Rep. Gallatin).
97
Id. at 1986 (statement of Rep. Otis); see also id. at 1991 (statement of Rep. Harper)
(“allow[ing] that the States have a right to admit such foreigners as they think proper till a certain
period” but insisting that “the General Government is, in the meantime, charged with the common
defence”).
98
Id. at 2022 (statement of Rep. Smith).
99
Id. at 1982.
100
Id. at 2022 (statement of Rep. Smith); see also id. at 1982 (statement of Rep. Gallatin) (“It had
been an established principle in Pennsylvania, from its first establishment to the present time [to hold
out] every encouragement . . . to emigrants of all nations.”).
94
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the rights of citizens of those states.”
Congressional debate surrounding the Alien Friends Act reveals the
great extent to which the first generation of American statesmen
understood foreign immigration to implicate fundamentally local, rather
than national, concerns. In all but the most exceptional circumstances,
Republicans and Federalists agreed, foreign migrants were properly subject
to state, rather than federal, authority.
101

III. AN UNEXCEPTIONAL POWER: IMMIGRANTS AS PERSONS
IN THE ERA OF CONFIDENCE
The history of immigration law and politics in the nineteenth century
is, in an important respect, a history of repeated and progressively sharper
clashes between the regenerative model of assimilation and the seismic
social and economic transformations of industrial era: the concentration of
population and industry; the emergence of a permanent, “dependent”
wage-earning class; and, finally, the shifting origin of America’s
immigrants. In the eight decades between the nation’s founding and the
Civil War, Americans’ relative confidence in the transformative power of
immigration and in immigrants’ capacity for moral and political
regeneration directly shaped both the political construction of immigrants
and their legal identity as objects of regulation. During that period, the
perceived viability of the regenerative theory of immigration served as a
referendum on the vitality of American republicanism itself. As went
immigration, so went the Republic.
This Part analyzes the relationship between Americans’ relative faith
in assimilation, the regulatory construction of immigrants, and the
evolution of state and federal authority to govern immigrants and
immigration. Section A describes the ongoing defense and adaptation of
the regenerative model of immigration in the face of social and economic
changes that threatened to upend its core republican premises. Section B
then explains that throughout the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century
both the interests implicated and problems caused by foreign immigration
were understood by state governments and, to a point, by the United States
Supreme Court, in fundamentally local terms that warranted state, as
opposed to federal, regulation. States thus reserved substantial authority to
regulate immigration under their traditional police powers. The state
police power figured immigrants not as foreigners per se, but rather as
persons, whose effect on the health, morals, and welfare of the community
was governed under the same terms as that of citizens.

101
Id. at 3000 (statement of Rep. Smith); see also 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2022–23 (1798)
(statement of Rep. Smith).
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A. Immigrants as Americans in Waiting
The narrative of immigration as regeneration imagined the republican
system itself, as well the economic arrangements on which that system
rested, as a great hopper of assimilation with the capacity to transform the
oppressed dregs of the Old World into patriotic republicans. The
regeneration narrative evinced a certain optimistic, almost selfcongratulatory confidence that the transformative power of geography and
political institutions would preserve for all time the core republican values
of personal independence and citizenly virtue. Notwithstanding the
hopper’s tremendous power, however, its machinery was also remarkably
fragile. Its effectiveness depended entirely on the integrity of its various
constituent parts: independent, virtuous citizenship rooted in individual
economic proprietorship; the immersion of immigrants in social and
political institutions that promoted the adoption of republican values; and
finally, the moral and political natures of immigrants themselves. These
were the essential conditions of the nation’s liberal immigration and
naturalization policy, and virtually from the beginning they appeared
threatened by the same dangers that jeopardized virtuous republican
citizenship generally: concentrations of population in great manufacturing
centers; the clustering of immigrants into ethnic enclaves where, instead of
assimilating, they allegedly formed distinct political identities and interests
defined by their shared national origins; and finally, the emergence of a
permanent class of “dependent” laborers.
Over the first half of the nineteenth century, even as Americans
developed progressively sharper critiques of immigration, they
nevertheless retained a basic faith in the fundamental moral natures of
immigrants and in the capacity of American economic and political
institutions to transform foreign migrants into patriotic republicans. The
problems associated with European immigration were generally considered
fatal neither to the nation’s historically liberal immigration and
naturalization policy, nor to the regeneration narrative that underwrote that
liberality. So long as immigrants were properly diffused throughout the
nation, contemporaries maintained, the warm bath of economic freedom
and republican political fellowship would dissolve away the residue of Old
World economic and political oppression, and infuse them with economic
and political independence, habits of strenuous labor, and devotion to their
adopted nation. It was only in the late 1840s and 1850s that a politically
robust nativist movement gained broad support and political influence.
There began to take hold a critique of immigrants as fundamentally,
irredeemably foreign, animated by a deep suspicion that they either carried
no “dormant seed of virtue” as a matter of nature, or, if they once had, that
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it had atrophied beyond any hope or revival.
Although the nativist
movement was ultimately unsuccessful in its primary policy demand—the
extension of the period of residency required for naturalization—and was
soon swallowed up by the Civil War and the increased demand for
immigrant labor, it nevertheless represents an important chapter in the
legal construction of foreignness. This Section describes the defense and
adaptation of the narrative of immigration as regeneration during the first
half of the nineteenth century, and how that narrative was strained, but not
broken, during the nativist crescendo of the 1850s.
1. Challenges of Assimilation in the Young Republic
In an 1835 article published in the prestigious North American Review,
Henry Duhring, a German immigrant, prominent Philadelphia merchant,
and well known writer, crystallized both the mounting political and
ideological challenges posed by the swelling tide of poor immigrants, and
the ways in which Americans adapted and qualified the national
regeneration narrative in order to meet those challenges. Duhring
cautioned that, in recent decades, as the United States had become “the
natural and undoubted receptacle of the surplus population of Europe,” 103
Americans had been so “keenly engrossed by the task of counting our
rapidly multiplying millions”104 that they had failed to grasp the emerging
threat to American social and political institutions. In order to preserve the
American “sanctuary” as “the best and perhaps last hope of the human
family,” Duhring urged the nation to exercise some “regulating
superintendence” over “the enormous influx of foreign emigrants.”105
Should the nation neglect to do so, he concluded, “our social character be
liable to be infected by the vices and misery of older countries, from a too
rapid absorption of their redundant population, or our political institutions
exposed to overthrow and corruption by the undue accession of
unassimilating elements.”106 Notwithstanding his call to action, however,
Duhring maintained the two basic faiths that underlay the nation’s tradition
of immigration liberalism: first, that the vast majority of the nation’s
immigrants shared with Americans a fundamental moral nature, and thus
the capacity for regeneration; and second, that the nation’s great
assimilationist hopper would continue to transform Europe’s “surplus
population” into patriotic republicans.
The problem, Duhring explained, was that the “residue”107 of the
102
See Priestley, supra note 66, at 711 (using the phrase “dormant seed of virtue” to describe the
redeemable moral natures of Old World immigrants).
103
Henry Duhring, Immigration, 40 N. AM. REV. 457, 459 (1835).
104
Id. at 458.
105
Id. at 459.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 461.
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immigrant stream too often settled in the nation’s port cities, where, “so far
from being speedily and systematically absorbed into the mass of the
native population and dispersed throughout the country, they are allowed
by the neglect or indifference of the nation to collect in masses and to settle
upon particular points of the body politic.”108 There they remained
“insulated from all the friendly influences of the society into which they
have been transplanted,” unable to “undergo that nationalizing process,
which can only result from intimate and friendly contact in the walks of
private business and domestic life.”109 The problem was especially acute
among Irish immigrants, who had been reduced by “destitution and
misery” to a “state of disqualification for every pursuit of laborious and
persevering industry”110 and were “most inclined to linger about the cities
by which they have been first received.”111 The condition was not unique
to the Irish peasantry, however. “[B]y robbing labor of its just fruits, and
diverting so large a portion to the supply of the church and state,” Duhring
explained, the governments of Europe had “deprived the individual of a
just reliance upon his own resources and prevented the acquisition of those
habits of patient and unremitted application, which can scarcely be
implanted with success, except in early life and by the animating
expectation of a fair and certain profit on personal effort.”112 As there was
108

Id. at 464.
Id. at 461–62. The Society for the Prevention of Pauperism in the City of New York similarly
lamented the mass of poor immigrants who, upon arrival in New York, “instead of seeking the interior,
. . . cluster in our cities, or sojourn along our sea-board, depending on the incidents of time, charity, or
depredation, for subsistence.” SOC’Y FOR THE PREVENTION OF PAUPERISM, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT
ON THE MANAGERS OF THE SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF PAUPERISM IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
DEC. 29, 1819, TO WHICH IS ADDED AN APPENDIX, ON THE SUBJECT OF PAUPERISM 19 (1920)
[hereinafter SECOND ANNUAL REPORT].
110
Duhring, supra note 103, at 469. The Irish were frequently singled out for their alleged
difficulties in assimilating. Francis Lieber, the noted jurist, political economist and public intellectual,
explained that, because the “great and laudable desire” of a German immigrant “is always to get a form,
and to own it,” he “generally remains in a large city only so long as he cannot help it.” The Irish,
however, were “very different.” “[T]hey prefer the cities, and wherever you meet with a populous
place in the United States . . . you are sure to find a great number of poor Irish in and about it.” 1
FRANCIS LIEBER, THE STRANGER IN AMERICA 84–85 (1835). They likewise “clan more together than
the emigrants from any other nation,” Lieber observed. 2 FRANCIS LIEBER, THE STRANGER IN
AMERICA 40 (1835). Timothy Dwight, the renowned theologian and President of Yale College, voiced
a typical critique of the Irish character: “From their extreme ignorance, their apprehensions concerning
moral obligation must be essentially defective; and this defectiveness must be increased by the
doctrines taught in the Romish church concerning absolution, indulgences, and other licentious tenets.”
3 TIMOTHY DWIGHT, TRAVELS; IN NEW-ENGLAND AND NEW-YORK 533 (1822). Even the character of
the Irish, however, by consensus the least assimilable of America’s immigrants, was understood to be
morally redeemable. The various “evils” associated with Irish immigrants, Dwight explained, were
“not . . . derived from the native character of these people.” The Irish were “[un]surpassed in native
activity of mind, sprightliness, wit, good-nature, generosity, affection, and gratitude. Their peculiar
defects, and vices . . . are owing to the want of education, or to a bad one.” Id.
111
Duhring, supra note 103, at 466.
112
Id. at 461.
109
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“no charm in the middle passage to remove from [their] character the
impress of recklessness and ignorance,”113 such immigrants “landed on the
quays of New York, Boston or Philadelphia” in a state of arrested moral
development.114
To awaken in each immigrant the dormant seed of virtue, Duhring
counseled, Americans needed to instill in him the value of “property and
independence.”115 In order to set the immigrant on “a course of rigorous
self-denial and strenuous exertion,” it was “necessary to implant in him a
taste for many of the gratifications of life to which he has hitherto been a
stranger, and to enlarge the scope of his purposes beyond the mere support
of a reckless and precarious existence.”116 Such moral rehabilitation could
only be accomplished by placing each immigrant “in direct subordination
to the habits, genius and character of American society,” which would
provide a vital “species of national education.”117 The essential first step
was to procure for each immigrant “some situation where he shall be
detached . . . from the seductions incident to large cities, [and] brought into
direct contract with American habits and industry,” so that he may be
“fixed in his attachment to the country, and enlightened with respect to his
rights, his interests, and his duties.”118 Only by immersing himself in “the
pursuits of the community,” Duhring explained, would the immigrant
“become identified with its interests, and by some experience of its
benefits, . . . devote to it, not merely his fealty, but his affections.”119
Duhring proposed that the United States take certain affirmative
measures to “facilitate the transit of the emigrant from the sea-port to the
interior, and to promote . . . his safe and speedy resolution into the political
and social body, of which he is to be thenceforward a constituent
portion.”120 In order to promote the efficient diffusion and digestion of
foreigners, Duhring recommended the formation of “a very extensive and
113

Id. at 469.
Id.
115
Id. at 469–70.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 461.
118
Id. at 474. Immigrant aid societies, too, identified the tendency of recently landed immigrants
to congregate in cities as the principal impediment to assimilation, and urged immigrants to travel
immediately to the less densely populated lands of the West. See, e.g., SHAMROCK SOC’Y OF N.Y.,
EMIGRATION TO AMERICA: HINTS TO EMIGRANTS 16 (London, MacDonald & Son 1817) (“[W]e think
that young men, whose habits are not fixed, cannot pass too speedily to the fine regions beyond the
Alleghany.”).
119
Duhring, supra note 103, at 474. As the New York Irish Emigrant Association advised, the
Irish immigrant “will love with enthusiasm the country that affords him the means of honorable and
successful enterprise, and permits him to enjoy unmolested and undiminished the fruits of his honest
industry. . . . [H]e will himself cherish, and will inculcate in his children, an unalterable devotion to his
adopted and their native country.” 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 202, 205 (1817) (statement of the N.Y. Irish
Emigrant Ass’n, presented by Sen. Nathan Sanford).
120
Duhring, supra note 103, at 464–65.
114
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effective association” to assist the immigrant and to “enlighten[] him with
respect to the choice of an ulterior destination, and . . . enabl[e] him to
reach that destination as soon as possible after his arrival in the country.”121
Such an association should be truly national in scope, “spread[ing] its
branches into every district and village of the country” so that each
immigrant may go where “he might be most speedily and effectually
engrafted into the community.”122
Notwithstanding mounting reservations about mass immigration,
Duhring, like most of his contemporaries, thus retained a basic faith in the
value of immigration to the American nation, the moral natures of
immigrants, and the capacity of American social and political institutions
to transform the subjects of Old World monarchies into republicans. In
response to proposals to extend the period of residency required for
naturalization, Duhring maintained that “[f]ive years, under favorable
circumstances, are perhaps quite sufficient” to relieve immigrants of the
“moral incapacity” inflicted upon them by the governments they had
fled.123 “Even the throng of less brilliant, but not ignoble minds,” he
declared, “we welcome as life-giving streams in a thirsty land; as a strong
and animating testimony to the value of our institutions, operating to the
assurance of that faith . . . in . . . human liberty.”124
Even as most Americans retained their confidence in assimilation,
however, the narrative of immigration as regeneration had acquired a
heightened sense of contingency. The easy assumption that immigrants
would naturally disperse themselves throughout the vast, open American
continent and be absorbed into the tissues of the body politic had lost some
of its force. At the very least, the hopper of assimilation needed to be
jostled to prevent it from clogging.
2. Nativism in the 1850s: The Origins of Indelible Foreignness
Americans’ confidence in assimilation suffered its first significant,
121
Id. at 473. The Society for the Prevention of Pauperism in the City of New York similarly
proposed transporting “able-bodied foreigners into the interior,” where they could be provided with
suitable labor. SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 109, at 26. Such a program would not only
provide relief to the cities; the immigrant, “[i]nstead of bringing up his children in idleness, temptation
and crime, . . . would see them amalgamate with the general mass of our population, deriving benefits
from our school establishments, our moral institutions, and our habits of industry.” Id.
122
Duhring, supra note 103, at 473–74. As the New York Irish Emigrant Association explained,
when immigrants—and the Irish in particular—cluster in cities they become “perplexed, undecided,
and dismayed,” and “the very energies which would have made the fields to blossom make the cities
groan.” 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 202, 203–04 (1817) (statement of the N.Y. Irish Emigrant Ass’n,
presented by Sen. Nathan Sanford). The Association thus requested that “a portion of unsold [federal]
lands may be set apart or granted to trustees, for the purpose of being settled by emigrants from Ireland,
on an extended term of credit.” Id. at 204.
123
Duhring, supra note 103, at 476.
124
Id. at 470.
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though by no means fatal, shock during the wave of anti-immigrant
nativism that swept the American political scene in the late 1840s and
1850s. The so-called Know Nothings (and their formal organ, the
American Party) rode this wave to widespread, albeit relatively brief,
electoral success by denouncing Irish immigration, in particular, which had
surged to unprecedented levels beginning in the mid-1840s.125 The
nativists of the 1850s were ultimately unsuccessful in their declared
political goal of imposing harsh new restrictions on alien suffrage,
including lengthy naturalization periods and even post-naturalization limits
on the franchise.126 But their remarkably swift political ascendency signals
the moment when a critical mass of Americans began to worry that a
substantial proportion of European immigrants were fundamentally,
irredeemably alien to the national character.127
To observers with an eye on the nation’s burgeoning cities, the
confluent problems of increasing economic dependency, intense wage
competition from foreign workers, and progressively greater
concentrations of both economic production and population, were seismic
historical upheavals that threatened to erode the very pillars of republican
government. The Jeffersonian republic of economically independent,
125
See ZOLBERG, supra note 23, at 129 (describing the “tidal wave” or European immigration to
the United States in the 1840s and early 1850s). On the influx of Irish immigrants during the midnineteenth century, see KERBY A. MILLER, EMIGRANTS AND EXILES: IRELAND AND THE IRISH EXODUS
TO NORTH AMERICA 280–344 (1985).
126
See ZOLBERG, supra note 23, at 161–65.
127
Even observers who did not share the ideological outlook or legislative goals of the Know
Nothings recognized that the “swelling tide” of often impoverished immigrants “pouring into the
United States” represented an unprecedented problem. NYAICP, ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1858, at 33
(1858). New York’s leading charity, the New York Association for Improving the Condition of the
Poor, objected in 1852 that, whatever the advantages of unrestricted immigration to the nation as a
whole, “the disadvantages are mostly felt at the great point of debarkation”—New York City, where the
“worst part of the refuse class which is thus thrown upon our shores . . . clan together . . . [and cannot]
be persuaded to leave it.” Id. The Association’s complaint echoed the familiar concern that by
clustering in cities immigrants deprived themselves of the salutary, regenerative effects of full
immersion in American life and labor. But it also raised the new—or at least newly menacing—specter
of a vast, permanent class of foreign poor siphoning resources from the community. “Our actual
pauperism consists mainly not only of immigrants,” the Association reported a few years later, “but of
the accumulated refuse of about two and a half millions of that class, who have landed in New York, in
the past ten years.” As the nation’s principal point of entry for foreign migrants, the report continued,
New York City had “operat[ed] like a sieve, let[ting] through the enterprising and industrious, while
. . . retain[ing] the indolent, the aged, and infirm, who can earn their subsistence nowhere.” NYAICP,
ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1858, supra, at 36. Nor was the problem limited to the economic burden of
supporting thousands of “foreign paupers.” The unprecedented magnitude of foreign immigration to
the United States had given rise to a “profound sense of danger” not only to the fiscal integrity of states
and localities, reported the Massachusetts Legislature, but to the “social and political institutions of the
United States.” Report of the Joint Special Committee of the Legislature of Massachusetts Appointed
to Consider the Expediency of Altering and Amending the Laws Relating to Alien Passengers and
Paupers [hereinafter Report of the Joint Special Committee] (Mass. Senate Doc. No. 46, 1848), in
HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF THE IMMIGRATION PROBLEM, supra note 66, at 584, 587.
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politically virtuous producer-citizens appeared to be slipping from view,
crowded off the historical stage by new, characteristically “European”
forms of economic social and economic organization. As Americans’
confidence in the great hopper of assimilation wavered, critics of the
United States’s liberal immigration and naturalization policies typically
invoked two intertwined arguments for curbing the nation’s traditional
generosity. First, they argued that the disappearance in recent decades of
vacant lands and the increasing concentration of industry and population
had skewed two of the hopper’s integral components: immigrants’ ready
access to individual economic proprietorship, and their immersion in
American life and labor. The effect was to radically impair the capacity of
American economic and political institutions to transform Europe’s
outcasts into patriotic republicans.
Second, and most often, however, critics pointed to the poor quality of
the raw material that the assimilationist hopper was tasked to digest: the
fundamental moral natures of immigrants themselves.
A leading
contemporary chronicler of the Know-Nothing movement, Frederich
Anspach, was representative in blending an account of changing economic
organization and settlement patterns with a palpable distain for
immigrants’ moral constitutions. When the naturalization laws were first
formed, Anspach explained, “we were an infant nation . . . with an
immense territory . . . . It was an object of paramount importance at the
time, to have our lands occupied, our solitudes peopled, our roads opened,
and our cities built.”128 Faced with such exigencies, policymakers sought
to encourage immigration by permitting foreigners to acquire property and,
most importantly, providing for easy access to American citizenship. If
former circumstances warranted liberality, however, “[s]uch is not our
condition now.”129 In the new, post-agrarian republic, where “[m]uch of
our territory is peopled, our wide domain is rapidly filling up, our coasts
are protected, [and] our cities built,” the time had come to “guard against
the evils which do accompany the unparalleled influx of foreigners.”130 In
order to prevent hastily enfranchised foreigners from “convert[ing] this
asylum . . . into a despotism of oppression,”131 Anspach counseled the
erection of substantial new barriers to United States citizenship.132
If the digestive capacity of the nation’s territory and institutions had
declined, however, so had the quality of the “unbroken current which is
128
FREDERICK RINEHART ANSPACH, THE SONS OF THE SIRES; A HISTORY OF THE RISE,
PROGRESS, AND DESTINY OF THE AMERICAN PARTY 66 (1855).
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
See id. at 65 (“[W]e are clearly of the opinion that unless some radical change takes place in
relation to the admission of foreigners to citizenship, they will work disastrous ruin to our
institutions.”).
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pouring its millions upon our soil.”
“In the infancy of our national
existence,” explained Anspach, that current bore men “whose souls
throbbed with aspirations [to] freedom, . . . who either came for conscience
sake, or in obedience to those noble impulses which inclined them to a
nation of freemen.”134 In recent years, however, this “state of things is
materially altered.”135 A large proportion of the present mass of
immigrants was “unquestionably totally destitute of those elements of
character, which our laws should require before adopting them as
citizens.”136 The Irish, in particular, appeared beyond rehabilitation, their
economic and political independence hopelessly degraded through
generations of poverty and will-crushing domination by their native
government and the Catholic Church. Irish immigrants “evince too little
force and energy to be arbiters of their own destiny,” observed New York’s
leading charity, the Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor.
Rather than seek out opportunities in the West, they were “prone to stay
where another race furnishes them with food, clothing, and labor.”137 The
rising pauper class was thus distinctly unsuited and unwilling to travel the
traditional path to assimilation—namely, geographical dispersion. Even if
such immigrants could be persuaded to migrate to the interior, the
Association reported, they were “so pauperized in spirit,” and so plagued
by “ignorance, and physical and mental imbecility,” that they were “unfit
to be their own masters.”138 The extraordinary liberality of the young
republic had been “adapted . . . to the nature of the times and the character
of the men of that age,” explained Anspach.139 But recent events had so
133

133

Id. at 67.
Id. at 66–68.
135
Id. at 68.
136
Id. A Massachusetts legislative committee charged with recommending amendments to the
State’s laws “relating to alien passengers and paupers” similarly lamented the recent decline in the
quality of America’s immigrants. Report of Joint Special Committee, supra note 127, at 584 n.I. In the
“earliest years of the government, those who came here were generally persons of education, of
pecuniary means, industry and character,” who “added to the intelligence and wealth of the community;
while, as producers, they assisted in developing the resources of the country,” the Committee observed.
Id. at 584. By contrast,
134

[t]hose now pouring in upon us are wholly of another kind in morals and intellect,
and, through ignorance and degradation from systematic oppression of bad rulers at
home, neither add to the intelligence nor wealth of this comparatively new country.
As a body, they are consumers, and not producers to an extent equaling their own
physical wants.
Id.
137

NYAICP, ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1858, supra note 127, at 36.
Id. The Massachusetts legislature similarly complained of the swelling class of immigrants
who “cluster about in cities, and rarely express a willingness to travel to the new settlements west,”
preferring to rely instead on the state’s “liberally-sustained institutions, . . . to which they cling with a
tenacity commensurate with their moral debasement, want of self-respect, and abject and needy
circumstances.” Report of Joint Special Committee, supra note 127, at 588.
139
ANSPACH, supra note 128, at 68.
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transformed “the times and the people” that there was “no longer that
adaptation which existed at that period.”140 For many Americans, such
developments laid bare the profoundly contingent quality of the nation’s
traditional immigration liberalism.
As much as complaints of unassimilability grew more commonplace in
the 1850s, however, the view that a large portion of immigrants were
indelibly stamped by nature as alien to the American character had not yet
taken hold among a broad swath of the American public, and failed to
shape federal immigration and naturalization policy. Indeed, even writers
who in one breath condemned immigrants’ corrosive effect on the quality
of American citizenship could, in the next, affirm their faith in
assimilation. The renowned clergyman and author Edward Everett Hale,
for example, described with alarm the “Celtic Exodus,”141 and consequent
“annual invasion”142 of the United States by “a horde of discouraged,
starved, beaten men and women”143 whose “inferiority as a race compels
them to go to the bottom.”144 Within a few pages, however, Hale pivoted
sharply, adopting a markedly more optimistic vision of assimilation.
“[T]he country [is] richer for the coming of the foreigner,”145 he declared,
and “to attain the full use of this gift, the emigrant must be cared for.”146
Rather than throwing up obstacles to immigration, Hale insisted, the nation
“must open its hand to receive the offering of Europe.”147 Once here, the
immigrant should be welcomed warmly into the American political
fellowship, not as a gesture of national generosity, but as a spur to
140

Id. at 69.
EDWARD E. HALE, LETTERS ON IRISH EMIGRATION 51 (photo. reprint 1972) (1852).
142
Id. at 47.
143
Id. at 52.
144
Id. at 54.
145
Id. at 55.
146
Id. at 56. Indeed, commentators were just as likely to attribute immigrants’ economic
dependency—their “charge upon the tax-paying and benevolent citizen”—to the fraud and exploitation
that they encountered upon arrival in the United States, as to their fundamental natures. ASSEMB. OF
THE STATE OF N.Y., REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO WHOM WAS REFERRED THE MEMORIAL
OF THE CITY OF NEW-YORK RELATIVE TO THE LANDING OF ALIEN PASSENGERS, Assemb. No. 216,
68th Sess., at 5 (1845). A New York legislative committee could lament, for example, that “almshouses, prisons, dispensaries and benevolent societies are kept up at an enormous expense, almost
wholly for the benefit of foreign paupers and criminals,” yet lay the blame not with the “honest
immigrant” rendered vulnerable by “ignorance of our language,” but with “the unprincipled mariner’s
agent or boarding-house keeper; and . . . those who . . . abet them in their wickedness, and both
contribute largely to deprave and injure, and oppress with taxation our citizens and expose us to every
thing unworthy of a free people.” Id. Throughout the middle decades of the nineteenth century, the
state agencies charged with administering the landing of immigrants understood their primary mission
to be that of providing needy immigrants with care and support, including “protecting immigrants from
being looted by thieves or defrauded by deceitful boardinghouse keepers, inland transportation
companies, freight and luggage handlers, and employers.” Matthew J. Lindsay, Preserving the
Exceptional Republic: Political Economy, Race, and the Federalization of American Immigration Law,
17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 181, 198 (2005) [hereinafter Lindsay, Preserving the Exceptional Republic].
147
HALE, supra note 141, at 56.
141
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assimilation. “The stranger cannot serve the country while he is a
stranger,” Hale counseled, but “must plunge, or be plunged, into his new
home.”148 “He must, for the purpose we seek, profit by the measure of its
civilization. He must be directed by its intelligence. His children must
grow up in its institutions. He must be, not in a clan in a city, surrounded
by his own race.”149 Notwithstanding Hale’s dark assessment of the Irish
“race” pouring in on the republic, his proposed solution was a familiar one:
geographical dispersion. In order to “‘stimulate the [nation’s]
absorbents,’” Hale urged, “private action and public policy in this matter
should unite . . . [so] that each little duct, the country through, may drink
its share, of those drops which some do not taste at all, of the perpetual
Westward flood.”150
In contrast to the immigration restriction movement of the latenineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in the 1850s even those critics
who were most skeptical of immigrants’ capacity for assimilation usually
advocated limiting access to American citizenship rather than excluding
immigrants from American territory.151 Foreigners’ “opinions need to be
recast before they [can] intelligently participate in public affairs,” wrote the
Know Nothing Anspach.152 “[E]ven a residence of fifteen or more years is
absolutely essential in most instances before a man can vote
intelligently,”153 he counseled. Indeed, to the extent that leading nativists
sought to reduce the number of immigrants entering the country, they
proposed to do so not by restricting immigration per se, but rather by
removing the “inducements” furnished by “[t]he existing laws of
naturalization, by which the meanest serf of Europe could be converted
into a voter in five years.”154 This exclusive focus on naturalization stands
in sharp contrast to the anti-immigrant program of the 1880s and 1890s, in
which foreign laborers’ very presence on American territory—and
particularly their participation in the labor market—threatened to corrode
republican institutions.
Despite the intensity of the nativist fervor, it faded from political
prominence as rapidly as it had emerged. The nation’s enduring, if
148

Id. at 57.
Id.
150
Id.
151
See ANSPACH, supra note 128, at 71 (“There are numerous . . . weighty reasons . . . for a
change in the laws relating to this subject [of naturalization]. . . . [P]ersons reared on foreign soil . . .
cannot possibly possess the needful qualifications of citizenship after the few years’ residence which is
now the only condition.”).
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Id.
153
Id.
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THOMAS R. WHITNEY, A DEFENCE OF THE AMERICAN POLICY, AS OPPOSED TO THE
ENCROACHMENTS OF FOREIGN INFLUENCE, AND ESPECIALLY TO THE INTERFERENCE OF THE PAPACY IN
THE POLITICAL INTERESTS AND AFFAIRS OF THE UNITED STATES 314 (Jerome S. Ozer ed., photo.
reprint 1971) (1856).
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increasingly cautious, faith in assimilation combined with the surging labor
demands of the Civil War to submerge for another generation the
immigration illiberalism of the 1850s. An 1864 report issued by the
United States Senate Committee on Agriculture suggested the great extent
to which Americans’ assessment of immigrants’ suitability for republican
institutions—their fundamental moral natures—was very much shaped by
the nation’s current economic circumstances.155 After declaring that “the
encouragement of foreign immigration [w]as of the highest importance,”
the Committee proceeded to sweep away the doubts that had mounted over
the previous decade about both the continuing effectiveness of the
American hopper of assimilation and the quality of the foreign material
that the hopper was expected to assimilate.156 “The rapid growth of our
country arises from three causes, equally necessary,”157 the Committee
reported:
[F]irst, the extent of unoccupied soil, with a climate and
fertility not surpassed in any portion of the world; second, a
native population, free, hardy, industrious, improved by a
mixture of the blood of all the European nations, engrafted
on the anglo-Saxon stock, and incited to great activity by
institutions offering the highest honors and rewards to those
who, by industry and merit, deserve them; and third, the
addition to and absorption into our population of a large
number annually of immigrants, whose labor adds to our
annual production an amount increasing at a compound
ratio . . . . 158
In marked contrast to the pessimism of the previous decade, the Committee
reaffirmed in one breath the essential plot points of the traditional narrative
of immigration as regeneration: the transformative capacity of an open
continent and free institutions, and the suppleness and redeemability of
immigrants’ moral natures.
B. Immigrants as Persons: The State Police Authority
As we have seen, during the nation’s first century, immigrants’ noncitizenship generally did not operate as a presumptively natural, selfevident marker of legal difference; nor did it trigger an exclusively federal,
constitutionally exceptional form of regulatory authority. Rather, until the
1870s the individual states engaged in substantial regulation of
155

STAFF OF S. COMM. ON AGRIC., 38TH CONG., REPORT ON THE ENACTMENT OF SUITABLE
LAWS FOR THE ENCOURAGEMENT AND PROTECTION OF FOREIGN IMMIGRANTS 1 (Comm. Print 1864).
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id.
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immigration under their traditional police powers. The state police power
figured immigrants simply as persons, whose effect on the health, morals
and welfare of the community was governed under the same terms as that
of citizens. The Supreme Court’s mid-century immigration law opinions
likewise treated non-citizenship as a relatively inconsequential aspect of an
immigrant’s legal identity. After briefly sketching the contours of state
regulatory practice during the first half of the nineteenth century, this
Section explores the debate among lawyers and jurists over the proper
source, scope, and locus of governmental authority to regulate
immigration, and the body of constitutional immigration law that this
debate produced.
1. Immigration Localism in the Era of Confidence
Before the 1870s, the federal government exercised very little
authority over immigration, neither establishing terms of eligibility for
foreigners’ admission into United States territory nor processing their
entry.159
Rather, the seaboard states—foremost New York and
Massachusetts—administered the landing of immigrants, and each
individual state determined the rights and privileges of foreigners residing
within its territory.160 Even in the decade following the Civil War, most
Americans continued to view the problems associated with mass
immigration as an acceptable burden to bear in exchange for the
overwhelming economic benefits reaped from the nation’s traditionally
liberal immigration and naturalization policy. Because such problems
were understood to be local and discrete, the regulation of immigration
continued to fit comfortably within the province of state police authority,
under which states and municipalities regulated all aspects of public health,
safety, morals, and welfare throughout the nineteenth century.161 This
Section maps the logic of immigration localism that shaped the regulation
of non-citizens for the first half of the nineteenth century. That logic rested
on two pillars: (1) a broad consensus that the regulatory challenges and
159
The national government never acted to exclude any class of immigrants until 1875, when
Congress prohibited the immigration of prostitutes, contract laborers, or convicts from “China, Japan,
or any Oriental country.” Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (repealed 1974). The only two
federal regulations adopted before that time—the Passenger Acts of 1819 and 1847—were directed
toward improving the conditions of passage by reducing the number of passengers per ship. See Act of
Mar. 2, 1819, ch. 46, 3 Stat. 488 (repealed 1855); Act of Feb. 22, 1847, ch. 16, 9 Stat. 127 (repealed
1855).
160
See Lindsay, Immigration as Invasion: Sovereignty, Security, and the Origins of the Federal
Immigration Power, supra note 12, at 13 (stating that “throughout the first two thirds of the nineteenth
century, the seaboard states, rather than the federal government, exercised primary authority over the
landing of immigrants”).
161
On the pervasiveness of police regulations in the nineteenth-century United States, see
generally WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTHCENTURY AMERICA (1996).
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political interests implicated by the presence of foreigners—the problem of
economic dependency and crime, for example, or the desire to attract
laborers or settlers—were fundamentally local in nature; and (2) the lack of
any meaningful regulatory competition from the federal government.
In an earlier study of immigration regulation in nineteenth-century
New York, I demonstrated that mid-century regulators’ strong preference
for state, rather than federal, control over the landing of immigrants rested
on their confidence in immigrants’ moral natures and in the nation’s
powers of cultural and political assimilation.162
The New York
Commissioners of Emigration (“Commissioners”)—the state agency that
administered the landing of three-quarters of the nation’s immigrants from
its creation in 1847 until 1891—championed European immigrants as an
invaluable economic resource and the embodiment of free, independent
labor.163 Commissioner Freidrich Kapp, one of the nation’s leading
authorities on immigration, explained in 1870 that the United States
“owe[d] its wonderful development mainly to the conflux of the poor and
outcast of Europe within it”—to “the sturdy farmer and industrious
mechanic,” who through their “toils and sufferings . . . built up . . . the
proud structure of this Republic, which in itself is the glorification . . . of
free and intelligent labor.”164 Kapp’s sanguine assessment of immigrants’
moral and economic character was embedded in his, and the nation’s,
enduring confidence in the regenerative power of free labor and republican
institutions.165
Indeed, the Commissioners defined their mission to be that of
preserving immigrants’ moral fortitude and economic independence as
much as defending the state against the burden of caring for impoverished
foreigners. To that end, the Commissioners operated a refuge and hospital
at New York’s Castle Garden Depot for immigrants who arrived in New
York destitute or sick, and attempted to protect immigrants against a cast
of villains that was said to populate the areas surrounding the Depot,
including deceitful boardinghouse keepers, inland transportation
companies, freight and luggage handlers, and would-be employers.166
“The problem to be solved,” wrote Commissioner Kapp, “was to protect
the newcomer, to prevent him from being robbed, to facilitate his passage
162

See Lindsay, Preserving the Exceptional Republic, supra note 146, at 191.
Id. at 195.
164
Friedrich Kapp, Immigration, 2 J. SOC. SCI. 1, 2 (1870).
165
To the extent that immigrants were said to endanger the political health of the republic, the
threat came not from any inherent unfitness for republican government—as many came to believe in
the 1890s—but rather from their tendency to cluster together, forming political loyalties distinct from
the interests of the polity as a whole. The solution was thus not to limit immigration, but to break up
such ethnic clusters by encouraging, and even providing financial support for, westward migration. See
Lindsay, Preserving the Exceptional Republic, supra note 146, at 197.
166
Id. at 198.
163
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through the city to the interior, to aid him with good advice, and, in cases
of most urgent necessity, to furnish him with a small amount of money.” 167
He explained:
For, whenever the poor immigrant is fleeced by rogues, his
judgment is impaired, his energy is diminished, and in
general that moral elasticity lost which he needs more than
ever to start well in a strange land; and thus a heavy injury is
inflicted on his adopted country, which, instead of selfrelying, independent men, receives individuals who are
broken in spirit, . . . useless, [and] . . . burdensome to
themselves and to others.168
For Kapp and the others who administered the state’s regulatory regime,
dependency and vice among immigrants were not so much foreign imports
as products of the fraud and corruption they encountered upon arriving in
New York. The aim of the Commissioner’s paternalism was thus to
safeguard immigrants’ moral and economic character.
With respect to the governance of foreigners already present within a
state’s territory, non-citizenship only gradually became a constitutive
aspect of immigrants’ legal identity, over the first several decades of the
nineteenth century.
Historian Kunal Parker’s study of the legal
construction of immigrants in antebellum Massachusetts reveals the
“heavily contested process through which citizenship came to function . . .
as a barrier to the individual’s right to enter, and remain within,
territory.”169 In the final decades of the eighteenth century, the specific
town, rather than the state, “constituted the salient territorial unit,”170
Parker explains. “Every individual possessed a settlement in, or ‘belonged
to,’ a particular town.”171 This meant that an individual “had legally
recognized claims only upon that town’s treasury for purposes of poor
relief and legally recognized rights of residence only within the territory of
that town.”172 Because “[o]utsiders were specifically understood as all
individuals lacking a settlement in the town, rather than as individuals
lacking citizenship,”173 town officials did not distinguish between
“foreigners” who had been born and long resided in a neighboring town or
state, and “foreigners” who had immigrated to the United States from
167
FRIEDRICH KAPP, IMMIGRATION AND THE COMMISSIONERS OF EMIGRATION 85 (Arno Press &
N.Y. Times 1969) (1870).
168
Id. at 160.
169
Kunal M. Parker, State, Citizenship, and Territory: The Legal Construction of Immigrants in
Antebellum Massachusetts, 19 LAW & HIST. REV. 583, 586 (2001).
170
Id. at 590.
171
Id. at 588.
172
Id.
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Id.
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Ireland a month earlier.
Rather, they “remove[d] ‘foreign’ paupers to
places where they ‘belonged,’” which might be another town within
Massachusetts, a different state, or “beyond sea.”175 Between the 1790s
and the 1830s, a combination of historical factors176 caused a wholesale
shift in responsibility for the state’s poor, from the individual towns to the
state itself, thus radically expanding the number of so-called “state
pauper[s].”177 Only then, several decades after American independence,
did Massachusetts respond to the growing burden of poor relief by
“develop[ing] discourses of citizenship, foreignness, and cultural
difference that represented resident immigrants’ claims for poor relief as
illegitimate as the claims of aliens.”178 In doing so, the state replaced the
logic of settlement with the logic of citizenship, as foreignness—now
understood as the absence of citizenship—came to signify the illegitimacy
of an individual’s claims on the commonwealth.
174

2. Constitutional Immigration Law in the Pre-Federalization Era
This Section maps the contours of mid-century constitutional
immigration law through two landmark Supreme Court cases: City of New
York v. Miln179 and The Passenger Cases.180 Virtually all of the
participants in those cases, litigants and jurists alike, agreed that federal
authority over immigration, whatever its extent, derived from Congress’s
constitutionally enumerated commerce power. Disagreement centered
instead on the nature of the authority reserved by the states; in particular,
under what circumstances a state regulation was preempted by Congress’s
commerce authority. This Section argues that, notwithstanding the
individual Justices’ widely divergent views over where, exactly, the line of
demarcation between state and federal authority should be drawn, the
Court consistently drew that line based on the purpose and effect of the
regulation at issue, rather than the citizenship status of the persons upon
whom the regulation operated.
The 1837 case of City of New York v. Miln marked the first time that
the Supreme Court addressed the power to regulate immigration and,
specifically, attempted to demarcate the states’ and Congress’s respective
174

See id. at 588, 597–98.
Id. at 601.
176
These developments include: the State’s adoption in 1794 of a law making citizenship a
prerequisite for settlement, thus marking the immigrant poor as a charge of the Commonwealth; the
dramatic increase of European immigration to the U.S. following 1820; the expanding scale of poverty
resulting from industrialization; and aggressive, sometimes fraudulent, efforts by the towns to shift
caring for their own poor onto the state. Id. at 597, 601–05.
177
Id. at 602.
178
Id. at 606.
179
36 U.S. 102 (1837)
180
48 U.S. 283 (1849).
175
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spheres of authority. The case involved the constitutionality of an 1824
New York State law requiring the master of every vessel arriving in the
Port of New York from outside the state to report the name, birthplace, last
legal settlement, age, and occupation of each passenger.181 Neither of the
parties nor any of the Justices contested that Congress possessed authority
to regulate immigration under its commerce power.182 The legal dispute
centered on whether Congress had claimed exclusive authority over all
aspects of immigration when it adopted the Passenger Act of 1819,183
which regulated steerage conditions on foreign vessels bound for the
United States, or whether New York instead retained concurrent authority
to regulate immigrants after they had landed.184 George Miln, a shipmaster
convicted under the New York law, maintained that the reporting
requirement came into “direct conflict” 185 with the federal Passenger Act.
New York countered that the reporting requirement was not a regulation of
commerce,186 but that even if it could be thus construed, the State reserved
concurrent authority to regulate the landing of passengers so long as the
law did not come into direct “collision” with federal policy.187 A fiveJustice majority rejected Miln’s challenge to the law, concluding that, by
virtue of the Act’s purpose and object, it was “not a regulation of
commerce, but of police; and [thus] . . . passed in the exercise of a
power . . . rightfully belong[ing] to the states.”188
Echoing the state’s brief to the Court, the majority acknowledged that
the challenged statute governed the conditions under which foreign
migrants were landed in the Port of New York, but maintained that that

181

Miln, 36 U.S. at 130.
Gibbons v. Ogden, decided thirteen years prior to Miln, had established that Congress’s
commerce authority encompassed “navigation,” regardless of whether the object of navigation was the
transportation of goods or of persons. 22 U.S. 1, 197 (1824).
183
An Act Regulating Passenger Vessels, ch. 46, 3 Stat. 488 (1819).
184
New York acknowledged that a “commercial regulation” adopted by a state would be
unconstitutional if it conflicted with an act of Congress. Miln, 36 U.S. at 127. The Court agreed that a
state immigration regulation “partaking of the nature of a commercial regulation . . . would stand the
test of the most rigid scrutiny.” Id. at 139.
185
Id. at 116.
186
Id. at 107.
187
Id. at 126.
188
Id. at 132. The Court further reasoned that even if the reporting requirement “could be
considered as partaking of the nature of a commercial regulation,” it remained within the authority of
the state so long as it avoided a direct “collision” with the will of Congress. Id. at 138. Moreover, even
state and federal regulations that are “scarcely distinguishable” from one another may not collide if
they “flow from distinct powers.” Id. at 137. Because the most recent expression of national policy—
the Passenger Act of 1819—acted on passengers only “whilst on their voyage, and until they shall have
landed,” while New York’s reporting requirement applied to persons who had already landed, and thus
“ceased to be passengers,” the law’s “operation only begins when that of the laws of congress ends.”
Id. at 138.
182
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fact did not impeach its status as a valid police regulation.
The Act was
“obviously passed with a view to prevent her citizens from being
oppressed by the support of multitudes of poor persons, who come from
foreign countries without . . . the means of supporting themselves,”190 the
Court explained. For the purpose of defining the scope of the state’s
regulatory authority, the operative phrase here was not “foreign countries”
but “poor persons.”191 Indeed, the Court stressed the profoundly local
nature of the relevant legislative purpose: “New York, from her particular
situation, is, perhaps more than any other city in the Union, exposed to the
evil of thousands of foreign emigrants arriving there . . . .”192 It was thus
“the duty of the state,” the Court declared, to defend its citizens against the
“danger” of “being subjected to a heavy charge in the maintenance of those
who are poor.”193 Even though the reporting requirement governed the
landing of foreigners, it remained quintessentially a poor law, and as such
“form[ed] a portion of that immense mass of legislation which embraces
every thing within the territory of a state, not surrendered to the general
government,”194 including inspection, quarantine, and health laws. There
was thus “no mode in which the power to regulate internal police could be
more appropriately exercised.”195
The unexceptional nature of the states’ authority to regulate
immigration is reinforced by the fact that, while the section of the law
challenged in Miln applied to foreign migrants, the statute regulated poor
citizens in substantially the same manner, obliging shipmasters to remove
189
Id. at 141. It is especially revealing in light of the modern presumption of federal exclusivity
that New York explicitly acknowledged that the reporting requirement constituted an immigration
regulation. It had become “obvious” in recent decades “that laws were needed to regulate” the
“constant and steady migration” of Europeans to the United States, the State explained. Id. at 106.
That the law was directed at foreigners and clearly amounted to what would today be classed as an
“immigration regulation,” however, did not place it in an exclusively federal legislative domain. Id.
Because New York had adopted the reporting requirement “to prevent the introduction of foreign
paupers” into the state, the law was “a part of the system of poor laws,” id. at 110, and thus a
quintessential police regulation, which “may operate on persons brought into a state in the course of
commercial operations,” id. at 129, without making it a “commercial regulation in the sense
contemplated in the constitution,” id. at 110. And indeed, New York cited hundreds of statutes enacted
in dozens of states purporting to demonstrate that states had engaged in precisely such regulation since
the nation’s founding. Id. at 114–15.
190
Id. at 141.
191
Id.
192
Id. In its brief to the Court, New York likewise argued that the reporting requirement, by its
very nature, addressed a quintessentially local interest. Upholding the statute would “vest[] power
where there is an inducement to exercise it,” the State explained. Id. at 114. Because westerners in
particular sought “to encourage emigration” and cared little how many impoverished migrants were
“left as a burden upon the city of New York,” there was “a hostile principle in congress to regulating
this local evil.” Id.
193
Id. at 141.
194
Id. at 133.
195
Id. at 141.
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to “the place of his last settlement” any United States citizen “deemed
likely to become chargeable to the city.”196 It was thus “apparent, from the
whole scope of the law,” the Court observed, “that the object of the
legislature was, to prevent New York from being burdened by an influx of
persons brought thither in ships, either from foreign countries, or from any
other of the states.”197 Neither the legislature that adopted the statute nor
the Court that upheld it distinguished between the state’s authority to
protect itself against poor Americans and its authority to protect itself
against poor Europeans.198 Notwithstanding the legislature’s clear
intention to regulate foreign immigration, it was not the citizenship status
of the persons regulated, but rather the Act’s underlying purpose of
governing poor persons within its territory that determined the scope of
state authority.199
Finally, the majority opinion argued explicitly that there was nothing
conceptually distinctive, let alone constitutionally exceptional, about a
statute that regulates foreigners engaged in the process of immigration.
The Court drew a telling analogy between the governance of foreign
migrants under the challenged poor law and the prosecution under state
criminal law of recently landed “officers, seamen, and passengers who are
within its jurisdiction.”200 Just as “[t]he right to punish, or to prevent
crime, does in no degree depend upon the citizenship of the party who is
obnoxious to the law,”201 the Court explained, “the same reasons, precisely,
equally subject [Miln] . . . to liability for failure to comply” with the
reporting requirement.202 Each law depended upon the “same principle”—
“that it was passed by the state of New York, by virtue of her power to
enact such laws for her internal police . . . ; which laws operate upon the
persons and things within her territorial limits.”203 This formulation flatly
196

Id. at 154 (Story, J., dissenting).
Id. at 133 (majority opinion).
198
Indeed, New York insisted in its brief that to deny states the authority to control the entry of
foreign poor would necessarily deprive them the ability to turn away domestic paupers as well. Id. at
111–12.
199
The Justices in the majority made clear that the scope of the regulation’s territorial application
was likewise pertinent. “If we look at the place of [the Act’s] operation,” the Court reasoned, “we find
it to be within the territory, and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of New York.” Id. at 133. To the
extent that “we look at the person on whom it operates,” it matters only that “he is found within the
same territory and jurisdiction.” Id.
200
Id. at 141.
201
Id. at 140.
202
Id. at 141.
203
Id. If the power to regulate “the admission of passengers from Europe” is exclusive in
Congress by virtue of its power to regulate foreign commerce, the power to “regulat[e] the arrival of
passengers by land” must likewise be exclusive in Congress by virtue of its power to regulate interstate
commerce. Id. at 111. Under such a construction, the “poor laws, providing for sending back paupers
to their place of settlement, in the adjoining counties of a bordering state,” would become the exclusive
province of Congress. Id. at 112. And if “congress may regulate passengers from one state to
197
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defies the distinction, so crucial to modern constitutional immigration law,
between the application of ordinary domestic law to non-citizens and a
distinct class of “immigration laws” that govern the admission and removal
of foreigners.204
Over the next four decades, the Supreme Court would gradually
abandon the Miln majority’s theory of concurrent state and federal
authority to regulate the landing of foreign migrants. Even as it edged
progressively closer to a presumption of federal exclusivity, however, the
Court continued to focus on the purpose and effect of the regulation at
issue rather than the citizenship status of the persons regulated. The next
major episode in the evolving federalism of immigration lawmaking, and
the Court’s fullest attempt to demarcate the states’ and Congress’s
respective spheres of authority, came twelve years after Miln, in The
Passenger Cases.205
At issue in The Passenger Cases was whether similar New York and
Massachusetts laws requiring the master of every vessel arriving from a
foreign port to pay a small tax for each passenger—levied to fund a marine
hospital and to support “foreign paupers,” respectively—treaded
unconstitutionally into the exclusively federal domain of foreign
commercial regulation.206 A five-Justice majority comprised of five
separate opinions concluded that it did. The question turned on whether
the head taxes were regulations of police or of commerce, and, if the latter,
whether they collided with the policy of Congress.207 The opinions in the
majority shared two notable features: first, consistent with Miln, when it
came to defining the states’ and federal government’s respective spheres of
authority, the Justices were far less concerned with immigrants’ noncitizenship than with the purpose and effect of the challenged head taxes;
and second, the nation’s tradition of immigration liberalism informed both
the legal construction of immigrants and the location of the boundary line
another,” New York cautioned, “their power will extend to compel the states to permit paupers to pass
from one state into another state.” Id. at 130. Not least, “[t]he laws of the southern states in relation to
the intercourse and traffic with slaves” would be “abrogated,” rendering the subject “solely of federal
jurisdiction.” Id. at 111.
204
See Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 PENN. L REV. 341, 343
(2008) (observing that immigration law is organized around the idea that “rules for selecting
immigrants are fundamentally different from rules regulating immigrants outside the selection
process”).
205
48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
206
Id. at 303, 315.
207
Id. at 322. At least three members of the majority (Justices Catron, McKinley, and Grier),
along with the four dissenters, believed that the states possessed concurrent authority with Congress to
regulate immigration. For these Justices, the dispositive inquiry was whether the state regulation at
issue collided with federal policy. Justice McLean, and perhaps Justice Wayne (whose concurring
opinion is ambiguous on this point), insisted that because the Constitution vested the authority to
regulate foreign commerce exclusively with Congress, it thereby prohibited any and all state regulation.
Id. at 392–410.
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between state and federal, police and commerce.
Even as the Court struck down the state head taxes, most members of
the majority and all of the dissenters affirmed Miln’s basic framework for
evaluating the scope of the states’ authority to regulate immigration. The
purpose and effect of the regulation remained dispositive. The Justices in
the majority were particularly bothered by the statutes’ failure to
distinguish, on the one hand, between immigrants who, due to poverty or
physical incapacity, were likely to become public charges and, on the
other, healthy, economically independent immigrants whose migration the
United States had long sought to encourage. The majority rejected the
states’ argument that because a state may exclude “paupers” or “lunatics”
under its police power, “therefore she may exclude all persons, whether
they come within this category or not.”208 The head taxes exceeded the
bounds of state authority not because they applied to foreign migrants, but
because they applied to all foreign migrants equally, including those who
posed no threat to the public health, morals, or welfare. The state “may
exclude putrid and pestilential goods from being landed on her shores,”
Justice Grier explained, “yet it does not follow that she may prescribe what
sound goods may be landed, or prohibit their importation altogether.”209
The over-inclusiveness of the head taxes appeared to defy their asserted
regulatory purpose of protecting the state against the burden of caring for
sick and dependent foreigners, and thus impeached their validity as police
regulations.210 The distinction between immigrants who were fit to
assimilate into American economic and political institutions and those who
appeared destined for lives of pauperism and dependency thus took on
constitutional meaning in the Court’s continuing struggle to define the
boundary between commerce and police. Just as the regulation of healthy,
economically independent immigrants lay beyond the scope of state
authority, Justice Wayne explained, “[p]aupers, vagabonds, and fugitives
never have been subjects of rightful national intercourse, or of commercial
regulations.”211
If the Miln majority figured immigrants as mere “persons,” The
208
Id. at 463 (Grier, J., concurring); see also id. at 410 (McLean, J., concurring) (arguing that,
while each state possesses “an unquestionable power to protect itself from foreign paupers and other
persons who would be a public charge,” the state exceeded its police authority by extracting head taxes
from passengers who did not fit that description); id. at 426–27 (Wayne, J., concurring) (arguing that
the states are forbidden to exercise their police powers “over those who are not paupers, vagabonds, or
fugitives”); id. at 448 (Catron, J., concurring) (arguing that the passengers subject to the state tax “were
not subjects of any police power or sanitary regulation, but healthy persons of good moral character”).
209
Id. at 463.
210
Notably, it also prompted a charge of injustice toward immigrants themselves. “The powers
used for self-defence and protection against harm,” Justice Grier insisted, “cannot be perverted into
weapons of offence and aggression upon the rights of others.” Id.
211
Id. at 426 (Wayne, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Passenger Cases marked their emergence as “subjects of commerce.”212
The Court had laid the foundation for that construction twenty-five years
earlier, in Gibbons v. Ogden.213 In Gibbons, Chief Justice Marshall
famously concluded that commerce encompassed not only “buying and
selling, or the interchange of commodities,” but also “commercial
intercourse” more broadly, including “navigation,” regardless of whether
the things transported were goods or passengers.214 For the purpose of
defining the scope of congressional authority, explained Justice McLean,
“no just distinction can be made . . . between the transportation of
merchandise and passengers.”215 Other Justices in the majority similarly
affirmed that “persons as well as slaves may be the subjects of importation
and commerce.”216
Even as the majority figured immigrants as subjects of foreign
commerce, it was the commercial nature of their voyage rather than their
non-citizenship that dictated the form of authority to which they were
subject.217 Several of the Justices in the majority insisted that, so long as
the commercial goods at issue were transported across state lines, the
Commerce Clause was indifferent to national origin of either the goods
themselves or the persons engaged in their transportation. States were
prohibited equally from imposing a duty upon merchandise “from one
212

Id. at 432–33.
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
214
Id. at 189–90.
215
The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 405 (McLean, J., concurring in the judgment).
216
E.g., id. at 414 (Wayne, J. concurring in the judgment). As this statement suggests, the debate
among the Justices over the relative authority of the states and the federal government to control the
landing of immigrants unfolded in the shadow of mounting sectional conflict over slavery.
Specifically, the mostly pro-slavery dissenters rejected the notion that immigrants could be subjects of
commerce, at least in part because that view suggested that Congress might also have the constitutional
authority to regulate other human articles of commerce—namely slaves. Justices Taney and
Woodberry, in particular, warned that the scope of the federal commerce power directly implicated the
ability of the states to regulate the entry into their territory of slaves and free blacks. If the federal
commerce power was exclusive of state regulations such as the challenged head taxes, Justice
Woodbury explained, “all the laws of Ohio, Mississippi, and many other States, either forbidding or
taxing the entrance of slaves or liberated blacks, will be nullified.” Id. at 567 (Woodbury, J.,
dissenting). Chief Justice Taney—who eight years later wrote the majority opinion in Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857)—similarly worried that if the federal government could oblige states to
receive immigrants, then “emancipated slaves of the West Indies have at this hour the absolute right to
reside, hire houses, and traffic and trade throughout the Southern States, in spite of any State law to the
contrary; inevitably producing the most serious discontent, and ultimately leading to the most painful
consequences.” The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 474 (Taney, C.J., dissenting); see generally
Bilder, supra note 32 (arguing that the Court was unable to reach consensus on the nature of
Congress’s commerce authority over immigration for most of the nineteenth century because the
politics and legal culture of slavery prevented some Justices from accepting that immigrants could be
“articles of commerce”).
217
See The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 450–51 (Catron, J., concurring in the judgment)
(referencing the United States’s commercial treaty with Great Britain as an example of national
authority to allow foreign entrants into the country).
213
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State to another State or [from] foreign countries,” irrespective of whether
the importers “are citizens or foreigners.”218 The majority likewise
presumed that a holding with respect to foreign commerce would apply
symmetrically to domestic interstate commerce. If New York could lay a
tax on passengers arriving from Europe, Justice McLean warned, “the
same principle [would] sustain a right in every State to tax all persons who
shall pass through its territory on railroad-cars, canal-boats, stages, or in
any other manner.”219 The consequence would be to “enable a State to
establish and enforce a non-intercourse with every other State.”220
For some members of the majority, the fact that the head taxes
regulated foreign commerce was sufficient to render them
unconstitutional.221 For others, however, the head taxes were invalid only
if they collided with the will of Congress.222 That Congress had engaged in
very little meaningful regulation of immigration might have suggested that
the field remained largely open to state legislation—as the dissenters
argued, either a reflection of Congress’s indifference or an invitation to the
states to legislate. Instead, the Justices in the majority interpreted
Congress’s relative inaction as an affirmative federal policy of encouraging
immigration. “From the first day of our [nation’s] separate existence,”
Justice Catron reasoned, “has the policy of drawing hither aliens, to the end
of becoming citizens, been a favorite policy of the United States, . . .
cherished by Congress with rare steadiness and vigor.”223 No state could
“claim the power of thwarting by its own authority the established policy
of all the States united.”224
The specific meaning that the Justices in the majority attached to the
dearth of federal regulation appeared to reflect each man’s assessment of
the economic and political virtues of immigration, and particularly his
relative faith in assimilation. Through the long-standing national policy of
immigration liberalism, Justice Catron maintained, “our extensive and
fertile country has been . . . filled up by a respectable population . . . that is
easily governed and usually of approved patriotism.”225 “Keeping in view
the spirit of the Declaration of Independence with respect to the
importance of augmenting the population of the United States,” Congress
218

Id. at 417 (Wayne, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 407 (McLean, J., concurring).
220
Id. Justice Catron similarly cautioned that if “aliens belonging to foreign commerce, and
passengers coming from other States, could have a poll-tax levied on them on entering any port of a
State, . . . the great inlets of commerce might raise all necessary revenues from foreign intercourse, and
from intercourse among the States.” Id. at 448 (Catron, J., concurring).
221
See supra note 207.
222
The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 434 (Wayne, J., concurring).
223
Id. at 440 (Catron, J., concurring in the judgment).
224
Id. at 443.
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Id. at 440.
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had frequently passed laws “to facilitate and encourage . . . the
immigration of Europeans into the United States.”226 It was evident from
the “repeated and well-considered acts of legislation,” including the
Passenger Act of 1819 and various laws exempting from duties certain
household items and workmen’s tools, that “Congress has covered, and has
intended to cover the whole field of legislation over this branch of
commerce.”227 Noting the nation’s “many millions of acres of vacant
lands,” Justice Grier similarly found it impossible to conclude that “the
framers of our Constitution had committed such an oversight, as to leave it
to the discretion of some two or three States to thwart the policy of the
Union, and dictate the terms upon which foreigners shall be permitted” to
settle here.228 Indeed, it remained “the cherished policy of the general
government to encourage and invite Christian foreigners of our own race to
seek an asylum within our borders, and to convert these waste lands into
productive farms, and thus add to the wealth, population, and power of the
nation.”229
This Part has demonstrated that, during the eight decades between the
nation’s founding and the beginning of the Civil War, Americans’ broad
confidence in immigrants’ fundamental moral natures and in the power of
American economic and political institutions to transform them in to
patriotic republicans directly shaped both the political construction of
immigrants and their legal identity as objects of regulation. Throughout
this period, the Supreme Court figured immigrants not as foreigners, but
simply as persons, whose effect on the health, morals, and welfare of the
community was, like that of other persons, citizens and non-citizens alike,
subject to the police power of the individual states. Even after the Court
redefined immigrants as articles of foreign commerce in the 1870s, the
Commerce Clause, like the police power, remained indifferent to
citizenship.
IV. FROM COMMERCE TO SOVEREIGNTY: FEDERAL AUTHORITY IN THE
POST-CIVIL WAR ERA
As we have seen, for the first century of the nation’s history, the
absence of American citizenship did not trigger a constitutionally
exceptional regulatory authority. For much of that time, the individual
states reserved significant authority to regulate immigrants and
immigration under their traditional police powers—an authority premised
226
Id. “[A]cting in the spirit of all our history and all our policy,” Justice Catron continued,
Congress “has opened the door widely and invited the subjects of other countries to leave the crowded
population of Europe and come to the United States.” Id. at 442.
227
Id. at 442.
228
Id. at 461 (Grier, J., concurring in the judgment).
229
Id.
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not on immigrants’ status as foreigners, but rather on the purpose of the
particular regulation at issue. As potential paupers or carriers of disease,
immigrants were simply persons, whose effect on the health, morals, and
welfare of the community defined them, irrespective of citizenship, as
objects of state police power.230
As I argued in Part III, in the 1840s and 1850s, the same aspects of
industrialization that appeared to threaten republican government
generally—the concentration of population and economic production in the
nation’s cities; growing poverty; and increasingly intense wage
competition, often from foreign workers—unsettled the nation’s founding
narrative of immigration as regeneration. Nativists recast structural
poverty as moral deficiency, impugning immigrants as indelibly alien to
the American character.231 Notwithstanding the crescendo of nativism,
however, the judgment that a large portion of foreigners were
unassimilable had not yet taken hold among a broad swath of the American
population.232 Even as the Know Nothings gained remarkable, if brief,
electoral success, they failed to achieve their stated goal of restraining
foreigners’ political influence by extending the period of residency
required for naturalization.233 Indeed, the nativist fervor faded as rapidly
as it had appeared, as sectional conflict over slavery and the enormous
labor demands created by the Civil War eclipsed the mid-century nativist
movement.234
In this Part, I argue that when the same seismic social and economic
upheavals that animated the nativism of the 1850s returned with a
vengeance a generation later, they transformed both immigration policy
and the nature of federal regulatory authority. Sections A and B argue that,
following the depression of 1873, policymakers, judges, and other
observers increasingly concluded that mass economic dependency had
overflowed the bounds of locality and become an entrenched problem of
national scope. At the very moment that Americans were proclaiming a
national “crisis of foreign pauperism,” the Supreme Court declared that the
laws under which the states had long administered the admission of
foreigners were preempted by Congress’s exclusive authority to regulate
commerce with foreign nations.235 As objects of federal commercial
regulation, immigrants were thus recast as articles of commerce.236 The
foreign commerce framework registered immigrants’ non-citizenship in a
230

Supra Part III.
Supra Part III.A.2 and accompanying notes.
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way that the state police power did not—after all, immigrants were articles
of commerce with foreign nations precisely because they were transported
to the United States from abroad—but nevertheless retained the purposeoriented analysis of the mid-century cases.237 It was the economic impact
of immigration on the nation rather than immigrants’ non-citizenship per
se that defined the nature and scope of federal authority. 238 Sections C and
D demonstrate that immigrants were legally reconstructed as foreigners,
and their constitutional personhood eclipsed by their non-citizenship, only
in the final decade of the nineteenth century. I argue that the political
construction of Chinese and “new” European immigrants as indelibly
different from “old stock” Americans animated the Supreme Court’s
reinvention of the federal immigration power as an instrument of national
self-defense.
A. The “Crisis of Foreign Pauperism”
Government officials and charity administrators had confronted
intermittent episodes of widespread poverty since the beginning of the
nineteenth century, most acutely during the depression years between 1837
and 1842, and again in 1857.239 Yet before the 1870s, such economic
downturns were generally understood as aberrant and unnatural exceptions
to an otherwise healthy and prosperous economy.240 The devastating
depression triggered by the panic of 1873, however, changed the basic
meaning of economic dependency, as mass poverty increasingly became
understood as a chronic, entrenched feature of industrial America.241 The
six-year depression was the longest and deepest in United States history, 242
and left as many as one-third of the nation’s workers jobless.243
Widespread begging and dependence on charity, coupled with the growing
assertiveness and radicalism of organized laborers, conjured for many
observers the intractable social stratification and class conflict of Europe.
As charities struggled to assist unprecedented throngs of jobless, ablebodied male heads of household, the nation’s vaunted ideals of economic
mobility and personal independence seemed genuinely vulnerable.244
237

Infra Part IV.B and accompanying notes.
Infra Part IV.B and accompanying notes.
239
ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, OUT OF WORK: THE FIRST CENTURY OF UNEMPLOYMENT OF
MASSACHUSETTS 9, 14 (1986).
240
Id. at 32–38, 47.
241
See MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE
IN AMERICA 69 (1986); KEYSSAR, supra note 239, at 250–52.
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KATZ, supra note 241, at 69.
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KEYSSAR, supra note 239, at 52.
244
See DOROTHY ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 57–58 (1991). During the
last third of the nineteenth century, explains historian Dorothy Ross, the sharpening conflict between
“the existence of a permanent working class” subject to the “vicissitudes of the business cycle” and the
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Though it is evident in retrospect that the mass dependency of the
1870s was attributable to a worldwide depression, declining wages and
prices, and extraordinarily high levels of unemployment, a preponderance
of contemporary observers focused on causes that were not so much
economic as moral. The culprit was not merely poverty, but rather a
“crisis of pauperism”—a much more menacing phenomenon characterized
by a deficit of virtue.245 As contemporaries diagnosed paupers’
fundamental moral unfitness for American economic and political life, they
increasingly noted the presence of large numbers of foreigners among the
emergent pauper class—an observation that quickly ripened into a fullthroated and nearly ubiquitous discourse of “foreign pauperism.”246 As the
New York State Board of Charities observed in its first annual “Report on
Alien Paupers” in 1875, a great “class of indolent and hereditary paupers
. . . [has] been smuggled into our country by the connivance . . . of foreign
nations.”247 These unnaturally selected European paupers, which were
“unchanged in character and tendencies” and still bore the “stamp of their
far-off origin,” could be “recognized by any thoughtful visitor to the homes
of the poor, in our cities, and among the crowds who resort to the offices of
the superintendents of the poor as eager applicants for outdoor relief.”248
B. Immigrants as Articles of Commerce
The process of federalizing a regulatory domain that historically had
been co-occupied, if somewhat uneasily, by both the states and the federal
government, consisted of a succession of complementary moves by
Congress and the Supreme Court. Beginning in 1875, Congress enacted a
series of statutes transferring immigration policymaking and administrative
control from the states to the federal government.249 During the same
long-standing ideal of a classless, or at least highly fluid, social, and economic system gave rise to a
“crisis in the national ideology of American exceptionalism.” Id. at 53.
245
Lindsay, Preserving the Exceptional Republic, supra note 146, at 205.
246
Id. at 211.
247
STATE OF N.Y., EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE STATE BOARD OF CHARITIES 137 (1875).
The Report claimed that the “practice of pouring the scum of a population—the criminal classes and
confirmed pauper classes—into the territory of a friendly state, is an invention of the very latest years.”
Id.
248
Id. at 112.
249
See Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, § 7, 26 Stat. 1084 (1891) (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. §§ 1551–74 (2006)) (transferring sole authority to administer immigration regulations to the
federal government, and creating the Office of the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization
under the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury); Contract Labor Act of 1885, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332
(repealed 1952) (prohibiting the immigration of any foreigner who had entered into an employment
contract with an American employer prior to departing his country of origin); Chinese Exclusion Act of
1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1843) (prohibiting the entry of Chinese laborers into the United
States for a period of ten years); Immigration Act of 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214 (codified as amended
at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1551–74 (2006)) (transferring authority over the landing of immigrants from individual
states to the United States Treasury Department); Page Act of 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (repealed

790

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:743

period, the Supreme Court struck down several existing state regulations
and upheld the new federal legislation.250 In so doing, the Justices reached
unanimous consensus that the transportation of immigrants to the United
States constituted commerce with foreign nations, and that Congress
possessed exclusive authority to regulate that process.
Following the Court’s decision in The Passenger Cases striking down
the New York and Massachusetts head taxes, New York attempted to
circumvent the constitutional infirmity by affording each ship owner or
consignee the option of paying either a $300 bond that would be refunded
after four dependency-free years, or a nonrefundable “commutation fee” of
$1.50, for every passenger arriving from a foreign port.251 The amended
law reached the Supreme Court in the 1875 case Henderson v. Mayor of
New York.252 A unanimous Court held that because the “purpose and
effect” of the New York scheme was to tax the landing of foreign
passengers, it was no less unconstitutional that the head tax struck down in
The Passenger Cases.253 The ever-growing commercial significance of
immigrant labor to the nation’s material progress was essential. As Justice
Miller observed,
the transportation of passengers from European ports to those
of the United States has [in recent decades] attained a
magnitude and importance far beyond its proportion at that
time to other branches of commerce. It has become a part of
our commerce with foreign nations, of vast interest to this
country, as well as to the immigrants who come among us to
find a welcome and home . . . . In addition to the wealth
which some of them bring, they bring still more largely the
labor which we need to till our soil, build our railroads and
develop the latent resources of the country . . . .254
Gone was the earlier notion of “two distinct sovereignties” exercising
1974) (prohibiting the immigration of prostitutes, contract laborers, and convicts from “China, Japan,
or any Oriental country”).
250
See Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 274 (1875) (striking down state head
taxes); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 278 (striking down a California statute empowering a state
immigration commissioner to require a bond for immigrant women determined to be “lewd and
debauched”); The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884) (upholding the “head tax” provision of
the federal Immigration Act of 1882).
251
Each bond was to be used to indemnify the state against the cost of supporting that passenger
for four years, at which time it would be returned. As the state expected, ship owners invariably opted
to pay the commutation fee. See Lindsay, Immigration as Invasion: Sovereignty, Security, and the
Origins of the Federal Immigration Power, supra note 12, at 24 (describing New York State’s revision
of its “head tax” law following The Passenger Cases).
252
Henderson, 92 U.S. at 267.
253
Id. at 268–69.
254
Id. at 270.
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“concurrent power” over immigration.
For the Henderson Court, it was
not the Constitution or the nature of national sovereignty that required
federal exclusivity; rather, it was history.
If Congress’s immigration power derived from the Commerce Clause,
however, it was an authority that extended well beyond strictly commercial
matters. Notably, federal exclusivity would enable the United States to act
as a single, unified sovereign in relation to foreign governments. As
Justice Miller explained, a law that impedes immigration “may properly be
called international,” as it “belongs to that class of laws which concern the
exterior relation of this whole nation with other nations and
governments.”256 Indeed, on the same day the Court decided Henderson, it
struck down a California bond requirement similar to the New York
scheme, declaring that the Constitution had not “done so foolish a thing” as
to allow “a single State . . . , at her pleasure, [to] embroil us in disastrous
quarrels with other nations.”257
Henderson devastated New York’s ability to fund the administration of
the Castle Garden Depot. New York responded by abandoning its
longstanding opposition to federal control over immigration and, joined by
several other seaboard states, lobbied for swift and aggressive national
action.258 Congress responded, somewhat belatedly, with the Immigration
Act of 1882,259 transferring authority over the landing of immigrants from
the states to the federal government; authorizing the Treasury Secretary to
enter contracts with state immigration commissions to inspect incoming
foreigners; and providing that a duty of fifty cents be collected from each
foreign passenger to fund the administration of the Act and to assist sick or
destitute immigrants.260
The Supreme Court upheld the Act two years later, in Edye v.
Robertson, known as The Head Money Cases.261 The Court’s unanimous
255
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The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283, 399 (1849) (McLean, J., concurring).
Henderson, 92 U.S. at 273.
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Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875). Under the California law, bonds were only
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which the plaintiff, a Chinese woman, had been assigned. Id. at 276. The Court was particularly
troubled by the potential for a single state to provoke an international conflict for which the national
government would have to answer. Id. at 280. By placing “in the hands of a single [commissioner]”
the authority to require or commute a bond, the Court worried, the California law empowered a lone
state official “to prevent entirely vessels engaged in a foreign trade, say with China, from carrying
passengers, or to compel them to submit to the systematic extortion of the grossest kind.” Id. at 278.
Under such a scheme, “a silly, an obstinate, or a wicked commissioner may bring disgrace upon the
whole country, the enmity of a power nation, or the loss of an equally powerful friend.” Id. at 279.
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Lindsay, Preserving the Exceptional Republic, supra note 146, at 215–17.
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Immigration Act of 1882, Ch. 376, §§ 1–4, 22 Stat. 214 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1551–56, 1571–74 (2006)).
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opinion—again authored by Justice Miller—further defined the nature and
scope of Congress’s authority to regulate immigration under its commerce
power. In reply to the plaintiff ship master’s argument that the fifty-cent
duty was an unconstitutional “direct tax,” lacking in uniformity and
imposed for a “purpose [that] has nothing to do with the general welfare,”
the Court observed:
The burden imposed on the ship owner by this statute is the
mere incident of the regulation of commerce—of that branch
of foreign commerce which is involved in immigration . . . .
Its provisions, from beginning to end, relate to the subject of
immigration, and they are aptly designed to mitigate the evils
inherent in the business of bringing foreigners to this country,
as those evils affect both the immigrant and the people
among whom he is suddenly brought and left to his own
resources.262
Thus recast as “the business of bringing foreigners” to the United States,
immigration qua immigration became a branch of commerce with foreign
nations, and thus the exclusive province of Congress.
As Justice Miller’s reference to the “evils” inherent in immigration
suggest, this great stream of international commerce carried not only
valuable immigrant labor, but also the substantial burden of supporting the
foreign “poor and helpless.”263 To endorse the plaintiff ship master’s
contention that Congress, too, lacked the power to tax foreign passengers,
Justice Miller concluded, would be
to hold that [the power] does not exist at all; that the framers
of the constitution have so worded that remarkable
instrument that the ships of all nations . . . can, without
restraint or regulation, deposit here . . . the entire European
population of criminals, paupers, and diseased persons,
without any provision to preserve them from starvation, and
its concomitant sufferings.264
This rendering of the federal immigration power incorporates within the
nationalizing rubric of foreign commerce the formerly local,
geographically and temporally discreet, immigration problems of
pauperism and crime. The Court’s vision of a foreign population of
chronic dependents being thrown upon the public stands in sharp contrast
to the nation’s earlier faith that, so long as immigrants were dispersed
among the native population, they would in time be absorbed into the
262
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tissues of the body politic and transformed into virtuous, patriotic
republicans.
On the one hand, the federal immigration power set forth in The Head
Money Cases and Henderson suggests that immigrants’ foreignness was
beginning to shape the authority to which they, as immigrants, were
subject: first, the discourse of “foreign pauperism” cast the implications of
mass economic dependency in increasingly national terms; and second,
immigrants constituted articles of commerce with foreign nations precisely
because they were transported to the United States from abroad. In this
respect, we might understand the foreign commerce rationale for federal
exclusivity to have edged the federal immigration power toward the
discourse of national sovereignty that anchors the plenary power doctrine.
On the other hand, and in marked contrast to the inherent sovereignty
regime, the foreign commerce framework retained the purpose-oriented
analysis of Miln and The Passenger Cases. It was the perceived economic
impact of immigration, for better and worse, that defined the nature and
scope of federal authority. Immigrants’ non-citizenship remained
incidental, or at least secondary, to the Court’s understanding of
congressional authority. In this respect, then, the commerce rationale of
the 1870s and 1880s represents less a step toward immigration
exceptionalism than an extension of the mid-century decisions.
C. “Imported” Labor and the Problem of Indelible Difference
Section B argued that, even after immigrants were legally
reconstructed as articles of commerce in the 1870s and 1880s, the essential
premise of federal authority was not immigrants’ foreignness, but rather
the commercial importance of the immigration system. 265 It was only in
the final decade of the nineteenth century that immigrants’ foreignness per
se came to dictate the source, locus, and scope of Congress’s—and, by
delegation, the President’s—regulatory authority. This Section argues that
immigrants were legally reconstructed as foreigners, and their
constitutional personhood eclipsed by their non-citizenship, as they
became understood as fundamentally and permanently alien to the national
character.
As Part III discussed, the United States’s traditional policy of open
borders, as well as the reservation of most immigration regulation to the
individual states, rested on a broad confidence that an open continent, easy
access to land, and liberal exposure to republican values and institutions
would assimilate all comers.266 In the 1880s and 1890s, however, a
growing chorus of observers lamented that the Jeffersonian vision of
265
266
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virtuous citizenship rooted in property ownership and independent labor
was fading into history. “[T]he conditions have changed utterly from the
days when the supply of vacant land was indefinite, the demand for labor
almost unbounded, and the supply of people very limited,”267 counseled
Henry Cabot Lodge, a leading congressional advocate of immigration
restriction. For Lodge and his contemporaries, industrialization had
rendered independent labor—and with it, the promise of assimilation—a
relic of the past. The belief that “the earth is the great disinfectant,”
explained the economist Richmond Mayo-Smith, “and that all we need to
do is get these depraved dregs of European civilization on to the land in
order to reform them—it is in this early civilization that this saying is
true.”268
If the industrial reorganization of life and labor caused contemporaries
to doubt the regenerative power of American economic and political
culture, however, legislators and others increasingly focused on the alleged
character deficiencies of immigrants themselves. As we have seen, in the
middle decades of the nineteenth century this critique centered on the
importation from Europe of “foreign paupers.” Beginning in the 1870s in
the western states, and the 1880s in the northeast, contemporaries turned
their attention to a new, more menacing phenomenon that they dubbed,
variably, the “coolie trade” (for Chinese laborers) or the “crisis of foreign
pauper labor” (for Europeans).269 Unlike the “foreign paupers” whose
economic dependency had long drawn the attention of lawmakers and
charity administrators, Chinese “coolies” and European “pauper laborers”
offended through an excess of economic competitiveness. Because they
were willing to work for virtually any wage, critics charged, they robbed
“American” workers of the ability to provide their families with a
“civilized” standard of living, and thereby degraded not only the labor
market, but also the economic independence of the citizenry—the
cornerstone of virtuous citizenship.270 As we will see in Section D, this
critique propelled both the legal reconstruction of foreignness and the
Court’s discovery of an extra-constitutional regulatory authority inherent in
the nation’s sovereignty.
Because the Supreme Court adopted the plenary power doctrine in a
case upholding Chinese exclusion, and did so in terms that appeared to
endorse Congress’s racist rationale for that policy, it is tempting to
267
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understand the doctrine merely as the legal expression of the anti-Chinese
racism that pervaded Gilded-Age political culture. Indeed, the author of
the decision, Justice Stephen Field, was himself a native Californian who
made no secret of his concern about the destruction of “white labor” by
“vast hordes” of degraded Chinese.271 But to reduce the Court’s
unanimous opinion in The Chinese Exclusion Case to its author’s hostility
toward Chinese immigrants misses the full meaning and stakes of
immigration regulation for late-nineteenth century judges and legislators.
Nor does it account for the Court’s adoption of a constitutionally
exceptional regulatory authority that the Justices knew would apply
primarily to immigration from Europe.
Rather, as this Section
demonstrates, the political construction of European pauper laborers in
many ways paralleled Americans’ contemporaneous condemnation of the
“servile” Chinese. Together, they depicted an invasion of the United
States by uncivilized, racially degraded, citizenship-destroying foreign
laborers.
1. The “Servile” Chinese
The political origins of Chinese Exclusion lie in the American West of
the 1870s, in a ferocious anti-Chinese movement led by the Workingmen’s
Party of California. By the end of the decade, anti-Chinese legislators in
California had amended the state constitution to permit a host of repressive
measures, including the exclusion of Chinese from certain occupations and
the forced relocation of resident Chinese into ghettos. The California
legislature also aggressively lobbied the U.S. Congress to enact a national
exclusion law.272 In 1876, the California Senate adopted a “Memorial”
titled The Social, Moral and Political Effect of Chinese Immigration.273
The Memorial captures the meaning that cheap foreign labor held for the
future of American citizenship and for the nation’s historical narrative of
immigration as regeneration. As with new European pauper laborers, the
271
In an 1884 case, in which the Supreme Court sustained a Chinese immigrant’s challenge to a
particularly harsh application of the Chinese Exclusion Act, Justice Field wrote a long dissent
describing what he considered the distinctly destructive characteristics of Chinese laborers. “[T]hey
had a wonderful capacity to live in narrow quarters without injury to their health,” he explained, and
were “perfectly satisfied with what would hardly furnish a scanty subsistence to our laborers and
artisans.” Chew Heong, 112 U.S. 536, 565–66 (1884). Congress thus adopted a policy of Chinese
exclusion in order to interrupt “the certainty” that “vast hordes would pour in upon us, overrunning our
coast and controlling its institutions. A restriction upon their further immigration was felt to be
necessary to prevent the degradation of white labor, and to preserve ourselves the inestimable benefits
of our Christian civilization.” Id. at 569.
272
On the political history of the California anti-Chinese movement, and especially the role of
organized labor, see ALEXANDER SAXTON, THE INDISPENSABLE ENEMY: LABOR AND THE ANTICHINESE MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA 68–78 (1971).
273
COMM. OF SENATE OF CAL., CHINESE IMMIGRATION: THE SOCIAL, MORAL AND POLITICAL
EFFECT ON CHINESE IMMIGRATION (1877) [hereinafter MEMORIAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA].
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so-called “servile” Chinese raised the monumental question of whether a
competitive market in wage labor was compatible with republican
citizenship. The Memorial’s political construction of Chinese laborers
became an archetype for the threatened degradation of American
citizenship by cheap foreign labor, and previewed the ultimately successful
arguments in Congress a few years later in favor of both Chinese exclusion
and the exclusion of European “contract laborers.”
California lawmakers, as well as a growing cross-section of American
judges, labor spokesmen, and economists, concluded that Chinese labor
threatened not only American workers, but also American citizenship. 274
To understand why, it is essential to appreciate the ideologically freighted
meaning that wage labor had acquired in the years following the Civil War.
Over the course of the nineteenth century, the early republican vision of
citizenship rooted in self-employment and the ownership of real property
gradually gave way, as industrialization transformed farmers and craftsmen
into wage workers.275 As the traditional Jeffersonian prerequisites for
independent citizenship became less broadly attainable, however,
Americans did not abandon independence as an essential component of
citizenship; rather, they redefined it. By the 1870s, there had emerged a
general consensus among congressional Republicans and political
intellectuals in the north and south alike that the sale of one’s labor was an
expression of self-ownership.
The wage contract, long thought
incongruous with virtuous citizenship, had become instead a token of
individual economic freedom.276 Critically, however, the new
274
See id. at 41−42 (describing the corrosive effect Chinese laborers have on the culture of
American labor).
275
See supra notes 25−30 and accompanying text; see also SEAN WILENTZ, CHANTS
DEMOCRATIC: NEW YORK CITY AND THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS, 1788–1850 107–
08 (1984) (describing the rise of industrial culture in Manhattan). By the postbellum era, a majority of
male workers labored for a wage for the first time in the Nation’s history. DAVID MONTGOMERY,
BEYOND EQUALITY: LABOR AND THE RADICAL REPUBLICANS, 1862–1872 28–30 (1967).
276
See NANCY COHEN, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM, 1865–1914 29 (2002);
LAWRENCE B. GLICKMAN, A LIVING WAGE: AMERICAN WORKERS AND THE MAKING OF CONSUMER
SOCIETY 17–34 (1997); STANLEY, supra note 41, at 75−77. Perhaps as much as any other factor, the
conflict over slavery transformed the cultural and ideological meaning of the wage contract.
Abolitionists extolled the voluntary exchange of one’s labor for a wage as the antithesis of slavery.
The compulsion inherent in the slave system, they argued, violated the fundamental tenets of both
economic morality and human nature, denying the right of man to govern himself, to enjoy bodily
integrity, to own property, and to dispose of his labor at market price. Consent became the language of
individual freedom, and thus acquired the moral and emotional weight of opposing human bondage.
See STANLEY, supra note 41, at 4−5; RONALD G. WALTERS, THE ANTI-SLAVERY APPEAL: AMERICAN
ABOLITIONISM AFTER 1830 121–23 (1978); William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor
and Law in the Gilded Age, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 767, 785−86 (1985). While this collective redefinition
of independence reflected a general consensus, it was by no means unanimous, as organized labor
continued to contest the easy equation of personal freedom with the wage contract. See DANIEL T.
ROGERS, THE WORK ETHIC IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1850–1920 155–68 (1978); STANLEY, supra note
41, at 68–70.
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compatibility of wage labor and personal independence was subject to the
essential condition that a man’s wage be sufficient to sustain a respectable
standard of living for himself and his family.
Against this ideological backdrop, wage competition between white
and Chinese workers served as a referendum on the moral integrity of the
industrial labor system. The crux of the problem, critics believed, was
Chinese laborers’ uncivilized standards of living. White laborers,
American and European alike, “cannot compete with Chinese labor,” the
California Memorial explained. The reason was not “any deficiency of
skill or will” on the part of white laborers, but rather their fidelity to the
“mode of life hitherto considered essential for our American
civilization.”277 Critics cited Chinese and white laborers’ respective diets,
in particular, as a source of competitive unfairness and a measure of fitness
for citizenship. “Our laborers require meat and bread, which [are] . . .
necessary to that mental and bodily strength [that] is . . . important in the
citizens of a republic,” the Memorial reported, “while the Chinese require
only rice, dried fish, tea, and a few simple vegetables.”278 The residential
habits of the Chinese were no better, characterized by “moral degradation,”
“the most disgusting licentiousness,” and “the absolute certainty of
pestilence arising from the[ir] crowded condition and filthy habits of
life.”279 “To compete with the Chinese,” the Memorial concluded, “our
laborer must be entirely changed in character, in habits of life, in
everything that the Republic has hitherto required him to be.”280 White
laborers would not be “induced to live like vermin.”281
Congressional advocates of Chinese exclusion sounded the same
theme a few years later. Nevada Senator John P. Jones quoted at length
from a letter he had received from a miner:
The forces of our civilization have . . . given me enough to
support [my] wife and [four] children in . . . decency and
comfort. . . . I have separate rooms in which the children may
sleep; my wife must be clothed so that she does not feel
ashamed in mixing with her neighbors; the children must be
clothed as befits decency and order and the grade of
civilization in which we live, and we must have a variety of
277
THE SENATE OF CALIFORNIA, CHINESE IMMIGRATION: THE SOCIAL, MORAL AND POLITICAL
EFFECT ON CHINESE IMMIGRATION; POLICY AND MEANS OF EXCLUSION, MEMORIAL OF THE SENATE
OF CALIFORNIA TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, AND AN ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF THE
UNITED STATES 41(1877) [hereinafter MEMORIAL OF THE SENATE OF CALIFORNIA].
278
Id.
279
Id. at 7.
280
Id. at 42.
281
Id. at 41. “[O]ur laborer has an individual life, cannot be controlled as a slave by brutal
masters, and this individuality has been required of him by the genius of our institutions, and upon
these elements of character the State depends for defense and growth.” Id.
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food to which we have been accustomed and a taste for
which we have inherited from our ancestors. . . . While my
work is very arduous I go to it with a light heart [because] . . .
I am in the hopes to bring up my daughters to be good wives
and faithful mothers, and to offer my sons better
opportunities in life than I had myself.282
Servile Chinese labor jeopardized not only the rate of wages paid to
American workers, Jones suggested, but the very pillars of American
civilization and citizenship: self-respect, social order and, not least, the
promise to future generations of upward economic mobility. “You cannot
introduce Chinese wages and Chinese laborers without bringing in Chinese
conditions, social and political,”283 Jones warned. Chinese exclusion
would therefore be “a blow struck at degraded, under-paid, under-clothed,
and under-fed labor, and it is a blow in favor of that fair remuneration
which the forces of our civilization up to this hour have decreed that the
laborer should get.”284
As the California legislature saw it, the problem was not the wage
labor system per se, but rather the state of unfreedom in which Chinese
laborers arrived on the economic playing field. The “trite saying . . . that
competition in labor is healthful” may be true enough, the Memorial
declared, but competition could not exist “between free and slave labor;
and the Chinese in California are substantially in a condition of
servitude.”285 Chinese laborers were “imported here by large companies
under contracts,” for the duration of which they were, “to all intents, serfs,
. . . let out to service at a miserable pittance to perform the labor that it
ought to be the privilege of our own race to perform.”286 “Even were it
possible for the white laborer to maintain existence upon the wages paid to
the Chinese,” the Memorial continued, “his condition nevertheless
becomes that of an abject slave, for grinding poverty is absolute
slavery.”287 Under such conditions, “[t]he vaunted ‘dignity of labor’
282

13 CONG. REC. 1741 (1882) (statement of Sen. Jones).
Id. at 1743.
284
Id. Senator Jones went on to explain why American workers might rationally prefer to
compete with poor Europeans rather than poor Chinese:
283

European laborers, men of their own race, while they increase the supply of labor,
also increase in nearly as great a proportion the demand for the products of labor.
On the other hand, while the incoming of the . . . “little brown man” tends to glut the
labor market to the full extent of his increased numbers, to nothing like the same
extent as the European does he increase the demand for products.
Id.
285

MEMORIAL OF THE SENATE OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 277, at 5.
Id. at 5–6.
287
Id. at 6.
286
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becomes a bitting [sic] sarcasm” and a “burlesque on the policy of
emancipation.”289
Under the traditional theory of immigration as regeneration, Chinese
laborers perhaps could have been redeemable. Notwithstanding their
alleged virtual slavery and degraded habits of life, in an earlier time liberal
exposure to republican values and institutions might have awakened their
“dormant seed of virtue,” transforming them into valuable and loyal
members of the polity, if not citizens.290 Indeed, as the Memorial
acknowledged, the United States had long “invited the people of foreign
countries to our borders . . . with the well founded hope that they would, in
time, by association with our people, and through the influence of our
public schools, become assimilated to our native population.”291 In the
case of the Chinese, however, the seed of virtue was not merely dormant; it
was nonexistent. “Their code of morals, their forms of worship, and their
maxims of life,” hardened over millennia by the “iron manacles of caste,”
now stood as “a barrier against which the elevating tendency of a higher
civilization exerts itself in vain.”292 From an “ethnological point of view,”
the Memorial explained, “there can be no hope that any contact with our
people, however long continued, will ever conform them to our
institutions, enable them to comprehend or appreciate our form of
government, or to assume the duties or discharge the functions of
citizens.”293 Notwithstanding a quarter-century living alongside white
Californians, the Chinese thus remained “the same stolid Asiatics that have
floated on the rivers and slaved in the fields of China for thirty centuries of
288

288

Id.
Id. at 7. In Congress, too, references to slavery abounded. Senator John Miller, a California
Republican and sponsor of the Senate bill that would become the Chinese Exclusion Act, urged that,
were the bill to fail, “all the speculators in human labor, all the importers of human muscle, all the
traffickers in human flesh [will] ply their infamous trade without impediment . . . and empty the
teeming, seething slave pens of China upon the soil of California!” 13 CONG. REC. 1482 (1882)
(statement of Sen. Miller) (quoted in COOLIDGE, supra note 269, at 168).
290
Under the provision of the Naturalization Act of 1790 limiting naturalization to “free white
person[s],” Chinese immigrants were prohibited from becoming naturalized United States citizens.
Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (1790).
291
MEMORIAL OF THE SENATE OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 277, at 14.
292
Id. at 6–7. The Memorial continued:
289

[T]he Chinese who inundate our shores are, by the very constitution of their nature,
by instinct, by the traditions of their order for thousands of years, serfs. They never
rise above that condition in their native land, and by the inexorable degrees of caste,
never can rise. Servile labor to them is their natural and inevitable lot. Hewers of
wood and drawers of water they have been since they had a country, and servile
laborers they will be to the end of time.
Id. at 6.
293

Id. at 7.
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time[,] . . . [i]mpregnable to all the influences of our Anglo-Saxon life.”294
Senator Jones was likewise incredulous that “[t]hese people, indurated and
buried under fifty centuries of stagnation, petrified in oppressive forms and
oppressive systems, are to be made good citizens of the United States in
one single generation!”295
In the context of the Chinese problem, the uneasy compatibility
between the industrial labor system, on the one hand, and the health of
republican civilization and citizenship, on the other, took on an urgent air
of racial contingency. The Memorial sought to clarify the stakes:
Are we engaged in building up a civilized empire, founded
upon and permeated with the myriad influences of Caucasian
culture; or are we merely planted here for the purpose of
fighting greedily, each for his own hand, and of spoiling a
country for whose future we have no care? If the latter, then
indeed we should welcome Chinese labor, and should
encourage its advent until it had driven white labor out of the
field. But if we have higher duties; if we owe obligations to
our race, to our civilization, to our kindred blood, to all that
proclaims our common origin and testifies to the harmony
294

Id. The Memorial elaborated at length on the self-enforced insularity of the Chinese and their
failure to absorb American values and institutions:
[T]hey remain separate, distinct from, and antagonistic to our people in thinking,
mode of life, in tastes and principles, and are as far from assimilation as when they
first arrived.
They fail to comprehend our system of government; they perform no duties of
citizenship; they are not available as jurymen, cannot be called upon as a posse
comitatus to preserve order, nor be relied upon as soldiers.
They do not comprehend or appreciate our social ideas, and they contribute but little
to the support of any of our institutions, public or private.
They bring no children with them, and there is, therefore, no possibility of
influencing them by our ordinary educational appliances.
There is, indeed, no point of contact between the Chinese and our people through
which we can Americanize them. The rigidity which characterizes these people
forbids the hope of any essential change in their relations to our own people or our
government.
Id. at 15.
295
13 CONG. REC. 1741 (1882) (statement of Sen. Jones). Indeed, faced with the prospect of
unchecked Chinese immigration, Senator Jones saw cause to doubt the ostensible liberal universalism
of the Declaration of Independence—the favorite authority of the bill’s critics. Id. at 1740. The fact
that the Constitution sanctioned slavery, he argued, served to rebut any suggestion that “the authors of
the Declaration of Independence intended to say that all men of all races were equal, and that they were
entitled to come to this country at their pleasure.” Id. On the contrary, “[w]henever this country
believes that the incoming of a race . . . is inimical to the best interests of our people, then the time has
come and the power is inherent to remedy the threatened evil.” Id. On the impulse of immigration
critics to revisit the supposedly “universal” principles of the past, see SMITH, supra note 23, at 360–62;
Lindsay, Preserving the Exceptional Republic, supra note 146, at 238–42.
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and consistence of our aims—then assuredly we must decide
that the Chinaman is a factor hostile to the prosperity, the
progress and the civilization of the American people.296
Would Congress direct national immigration policy toward the good of the
whole public—the guiding light of republicanism—or would it succumb to
the unbridled greed and unrestrained competition that, for many critics,
increasingly characterized industrial America? Because “the safety of our
institutions depends upon the homogeneity, culture, and moral character of
our people,”297 the Memorial concluded, the American political fellowship
“must necessarily be limited by race, nationality and kindred
civilization.”298 “[F]ree institutions are a monopoly of the favored races,”
Senator Jones agreed, because none but the Caucasian race was “capable of
creating them; no other race is capable of perpetuating them; no other race
is capable of treading freedom’s heights with firm and unwavering step.”299
It was this indictment of the Chinese—with its inextricable fusion of
economic, racial, and political deficiencies—that spawned the Chinese
Exclusion Act of 1882.300 The Act barred entry of Chinese laborers into
the United States for a period of ten years, and required any Chinese
laborer then present in the country who wished to depart and subsequently
return to obtain a certificate of reentry.301
296

MEMORIAL OF THE SENATE OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 277, at 45.
Id. at 14.
298
Id.
299
13 CONG. REC. 1742 (1882) (statement of Sen. Jones). For Jones and other members of
Congress, racial inheritance was destiny:
297

This race of ours has been struggling for centuries upon centuries for the principles
of liberty. It found this country a wilderness. Our forefathers made great sacrifices
to found the institutions which we enjoy. With unequaled valor they faced all the
rude forces of nature; they confronted and overcame the wild Indian and the wild
beast; they subdued the soil, and we, their descendants, on a hundred battle-fields
have fought to preserve the precious inheritance bequeathed by them . . . .
Id.
300
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, Ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1952). Congress first passed
the so-called Fifteen Passenger Bill in 1879, capping at fifteen the number of Chinese passengers each
steamship could land in the United States. See COOLIDGE, supra note 269, at 135–39. President Hayes
vetoed the bill, however, on the ground that it violated the 1868 Burlingame Treaty between the United
States and China, which recognized the “inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home and
allegiance” and promised to extend to each other’s citizens the same privileges and immunities as
citizens of the most favored nation. Treaty with China, U.S.-China, art. V–VII, July 28, 1868, 16 Stat.
739, 740 [hereinafter Burlingame Treaty]. President Hayes then sent a commission to China to
renegotiate the agreement. The commission returned the following year with a new treaty permitting
the United States to “regulate, limit, or suspend,” though “not absolutely prohibit” the entry of Chinese
laborers. Treaty Between the United States and China, Concerning Immigration, U.S.-China, art. I,
Nov. 17, 1880, 22 Stat. 826, 826.
301
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, 58–60 (repealed 1952). After federal
judges in San Francisco created a broad set of exemptions to the certificate requirement, Congress
amended the statute two years later, in 1884, to clarify that the certificate was the “only evidence
permissible to establish [a] right of reentry.” Act of July 5, 1884, ch. 220, 23 Stat. 115, 116 (1884)
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2. “New” European Immigrants and the “Crisis of Foreign Pauper
Labor”
As a matter of federal policy, the near-total exclusion of Chinese
laborers from the United States was singularly draconian. The basic terms
in which American lawmakers and others condemned the menace of the
servile Chinese, however, were far from unique, and bear remarkable
parallels with the nearly contemporaneous political construction of
European “pauper laborers.”302 The critique of European pauper labor
crystallized in the mid-1880s, in congressional debate over what would
become the Contract Labor Act of 1885. That Act, known as the Foran
Act after its sponsor, Ohio Representative Martin Foran, prohibited the
immigration of aliens who had entered into a labor contract prior to
departing for the United States.303 In introducing the bill in the House of
Representatives, Representative Foran began with “a general proposition
that can not be controverted, that the rate of wages determines the social,
moral, and intellectual status of a people.”304 “High wages signify
intelligence, ingenuity, invention, and a higher order of manhood,” he
explained, while “[l]ow wages signify debasement, ignorance, degradation,
brutality.”305 “Cheapen labor and you destroy the incentive that spurs men
to effort and improvement,” resulting in “cheap men, ignorant, degraded,
dangerous citizens.”306 In an era in which wage labor had become the
norm rather than a disreputable exception, the receipt of a wage adequate
to support a respectable standard of living had become a sufficient material
basis for virtuous citizenship.
(repealed 1943). On the construction of the certificate requirement in the lower federal courts, see
LUCY SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN
IMMIGRATION LAW 18–20 (1995).
302
I have previously explored this theme at length. See Lindsay, Immigration as Invasion:
Sovereignty, Security, and the Origins of the Federal Immigration Power, supra note 12, at 33–40;
Lindsay, Preserving the Exceptional Republic, supra note 146, at 220–50.
303
The Foran Act made it unlawful “to prepay the transportation, or in any way assist or
encourage the importation or migration of any alien . . . under contract or agreement . . . made previous
to the importation or migration of such alien . . . to perform labor or service of any kind.” Contract
Labor Act of 1885, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332, 332 (repealed 1952).
304
15 CONG. REC. 5351 (1884) (statement of Rep. Foran).
305
Id.
306
Id. Senator Orville Platt, a Connecticut Republican, further elaborated on the vital nexus
between high wages and a man’s fitness for republican citizenship:
[Y]ou must add to virtue and intelligence the prosperity of the citizen, if you expect
the Republic to endure . . . . [T]o lower the standard of wages below fair
remuneration is . . . vicious and destructive of republican institutions. . . . Up to this
time those who have been willing to labor in this country under our system of free
labor have been able to . . . comfortably clothe themselves and [their] families . . .
[and] by thrift and prudence . . . secure a little home; attach themselves to the soil,
and thus become conservative, patriotic citizens . . . .
16 CONG. REC. 1781 (1885) (statement of Sen. Platt).
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With fitness for citizenship among the nation’s growing class of wage
workers now measured, at least in part, by their capacity to maintain a
respectable household, legislators, economists, labor leaders, and others
directed unprecedented attention to immigrants’ “habits, customs [and]
modes of living.”307 In this respect, congressional debate over the Foran
Act echoed the construction of Chinese laborers two years earlier.
Members of Congress frequently referred to reports purporting to
document immigrant laborers’ dismal consumption habits, singling out the
“new” immigrants from southern and eastern Europe for special
condemnation. Representative Foran cited accounts of Hungarian laborers
“subsisting upon what an American laborer could not eat—such as mules,
hogs, &c., which have been killed or died with cholera and other
diseases.”308 “[T]he habits, morals, and modes of living of the Italians
[are] of the same general character,” he reported.309 Francis Amasa
Walker, the era’s preeminent political economist, lamented the “foreigner,
making his way into the little village, bringing . . . not only a vastly lower
standard of living, but too often an actual present incapacity to even
understand the refinements of life and thought in the community in which
he sought a home.”310 Foreign pauper laborers threatened to degrade
American citizenship not because they were poor, but because they
appeared incapable of even comprehending a civilized standard of
living.311
These critics routinely described European immigrants’ alleged
incapacity to appreciate life’s creature comforts in terms of heredity and
race. Henry Cabot Lodge cautioned that “[t]he immigration of people of
those races which contributed to the settlement and development of the
307

15 CONG. REC. 5350 (1884).
Id.
309
Id.
310
Francis A. Walker, Immigration and Degradation, 11 FORUM 634, 641 (1891).
311
The Supreme Court offered a similar assessment in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United
States, clarifying the class of immigrant laborers excluded under the Foran Act. 143 U.S. 457, 464–65
(1892). The Court explained that the purpose of the Act was to “raise the standard of foreign
immigrants, and to discountenance the immigration of those who had not sufficient means in their own
hands . . . to pay their passage.” Id. at 464. Quoting directly from the House committee report on the
Act, the Court continued:
308

This class of immigrants care[s] nothing about our institutions, and in many
instances [has] never heard of them; they are men whose passage is paid by the
importers . . . . [T]hey are ignorant of our social condition, and that they may remain
so they are isolated and prevented from coming into contact with Americans. They
are generally from the lowest social stratum, and live upon the coarsest food and in
hovels of a character before unknown to American workmen. They, as a rule, do not
become citizens, and are certainly not a desirable acquisition to the body politic.
The inevitable tendency of their presence among us is to degrade American labor,
and reduce it to the level of the imported pauper labor.
Id. at 465 (quoting 15 CONG. REC. 5359 (1884)).
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United States is declining in comparison with that of races far removed in
thought and speech and blood from the men who have made this country
what it is.”312 As a consequence, he explained, “[w]e have now before us
race problems which are sufficient to tax to the utmost the fortunate
conditions with which nature has blessed us.”313 Walker agreed that the
United States’ recent arrivals were “increasingly drawn from the nations of
southern and eastern Europe—peoples which have got no great good for
themselves out of the race wars of centuries,” and have thus “remained
hopelessly upon the lowest plane of industrial life.”314
Moreover, lawmakers frequently used the language of foreign invasion
to describe an American citizenry in jeopardy of degradation. Foreign
pauper laborers were
the Goths and Vandals of the modern era. They come only to
lay waste, to degrade, and to destroy. They bring with them
ignorance, degraded morals, a low standard of civilization,
and no motive of intended American citizenship. Like the
vast flights of grasshoppers and locusts, . . . they sweep down
upon our fields of labor to devour and strip from us the
benefit of our customs and of the laws protecting American
labor, and then take their flight again back to the breeding
places from which they came.315
The trope of invasion was more than just a colorful metaphor. Indeed, as I
demonstrate in Section D, the Supreme Court would soon adopt a
constitutionally exceptional immigration power crafted expressly to repel
foreign invasion.
This Section has demonstrated that in the post-Civil War campaign
against the “importation” of cheap foreign labor, immigrants’ foreignness
per se became a token of fundamental, indelible moral difference. Without
the requisite economic conditions and racial material, simply exposing
immigrants to republican political culture and institutions afforded little
value as a force of assimilation. Critics of the “servile” Chinese and
pauper laborers of Europe reimagined the American polity as a social and
political body, the health of which depended on the collective natural
endowments of its constituent members. From this perspective, the quality
of American citizenship would be defined in opposition to and defended
against the racially inferior, irreducibly foreign immigrant laborers that
threatened to degrade it. It was precisely this perception of national
vulnerability—this sense of peaceful invasion by a foreign menace—that
312

22 CONG. REC. 2956 (1891) (statement of Rep. Lodge).
Id.
314
Walker, supra note 310, at 644.
315
15 CONG. REC. 5369 (1884) (statement of Sen. Cutcheon).
313
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gave rise to the modern federal immigration power.
D. A Power “Inherent in Sovereignty and Essential to Self-Preservation”
The Supreme Court’s 1889 decision in Chae Chan Ping v. United
States, titled The Chinese Exclusion Case by its author, Justice Stephen
Field, reinvented the federal immigration power as an instrument of
national self-defense.316 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Field
fashioned the discourse of indelible foreignness into a remarkably durable
rationale for immigration exceptionalism. In so doing, the Court shifted
federal authority to regulate immigration from its long-standing home in
the Commerce Clause to the extra-constitutional concept of national
sovereignty.317
With the Immigration Act of 1891 and various
amendments to the Chinese Exclusion Act, Congress, too, played an active,
if underappreciated, role in claiming for itself the authority to legislate
largely beyond the reach of judicial review.
Chae Chan Ping, a Chinese laborer, had lived in San Francisco from
1875 until he departed for China on June 2, 1887. He brought with him a
certificate of reentry issued under the 1882 Act and 1884 amendments. 318
On October 1, 1888, while Chae Chan Ping was abroad, however,
Congress again amended the Chinese Exclusion Act to prohibit any
Chinese laborer who had resided in the United States and subsequently
departed from ever returning. The so-called Scott Act thus voided every
certificate issued under the 1882 and 1884 statutes.319 Chae Chan Ping
arrived in the port of San Francisco eight days later. When he presented
his certificate, the collector denied him entry on the ground that it “had
been annulled and his right to land abrogated,”320 and detained him on
board the passenger ship. The case came before the Court on a writ of
habeas corpus.321
The legal question in dispute did not invite, let alone require, a
reconstruction of the federal immigration power. Chae Chan Ping argued
that his exclusion violated the 1868 and 1880 treaties between the United
States and China, providing that Chinese laborers currently present in the
country “shall be allowed to go and come of their own free will . . . and
shall be accorded all the rights, privileges, immunities, and exemptions [as]
316

See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606–07 (1889).
See id. at 604–05 (articulating the concept of national sovereignty).
318
Id. at 582.
319
See Scott Act of 1888, ch. 1064, § 2, 25 Stat. 504 (repealed 1943).
320
The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 582.
321
Id. at 581. Chae Chan Ping acknowledged the nation’s “inherent right [as] a sovereign power”
to prohibit the entry of aliens into its territory—an authority derived, he noted, from Congress’s foreign
commerce power—but insisted that such a right did not authorize the United States to revoke his
“vested right to return.” Id. at 585.
317
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. . . citizens . . . of the most favored nation.”
And in fact, Justice Field
ultimately disposed of the basic question—whether Chae Chan Ping had a
treaty-based right to re-enter the United States—in a single, apparently
legally uncontroversial paragraph.323 If he had been so inclined, he could
have left the matter there.
Instead, Justice Field harnessed the discourse of indelible foreignness
to remake Congress’s authority to regulate immigration, from a power to
regulate foreign commerce to a power inherent in the nation’s sovereignty,
essential to its self-preservation, and “conclusive upon the judiciary.”324
Much of Justice Field’s opinion is an extended discourse on how Chinese
immigrants’ uncivilized, servile habits of life and labor, all rooted in
inexorable racial instincts, had made a mockery of the principle that every
man had an “inherent and inalienable right . . . to change his home and
allegiance.”325 Although the arrival of Chinese laborers in California
initially had “proved to be exceedingly useful,”326 Justice Field explained,
once they took up “various mechanical pursuits and trades,” they “came in
competition with our artisans and mechanics, as well as our laborers in the
field.”327 “[C]ontent with the simplest fare, such as would not suffice for
our laborers and artisans,” and without families to support, the labor
market competition “between them and our people was . . . altogether in
their favor.”328 Notwithstanding the liberal welcome extended to Chinese
laborers under the treaty provisions, they “remained strangers in the land,
residing apart by themselves, and adhering to the customs and usages of
their own country.”329 “The differences of race added greatly to the
difficulties of the situation,” Justice Field continued, for “[i]t seemed
impossible for them to assimilate with our people or to make any change in
their habits or modes of living.”330 As the arrival of Chinese laborers
continued “in numbers approaching the character of an Oriental invasion,”
westerners worried that “at no distant day that portion of our country
would be overrun by them unless prompt action was taken to restrict their
322

322

Immigration Treaty of 1880, U.S.-China, art. II, Nov. 17, 1880, 22 Stat. 826.
Justice Field conceded that the Scott Act directly contravened the 1868 and 1880 treaties, but
concluded that this did not invalidate the Act. Because the Constitution declares both treaties and acts
of Congress “to be the supreme law of the land, and [gives] no paramount authority . . . to one over the
other,” he reasoned, “the last expression of the sovereign will must control.” The Chinese Exclusion
Case, 130 U.S. at 600. That analysis reflected the Court’s long-standing position, which it had
reaffirmed only the previous term. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (holding that
when a treaty and federal statute conflict, the more recent one controls).
324
The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 606.
325
Id. at 585 (quoting the Burlingame Treaty, supra note 300, art. V.).
326
Id. at 594.
327
Id.
328
Id. at 595.
329
Id.
330
Id.
323
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immigration.”
Only after describing the Chinese problem in detail did Justice Field
turn to the nature of Congress’s regulatory authority. The threat of foreign
invasion served as the essential premise:
331

To preserve its independence, and give security against
foreign aggression and encroachment, is the highest duty of
every nation, and to attain these ends nearly all other
considerations are to be subordinated. It matters not in what
form such aggression and encroachment come, whether from
the foreign nation acting in its national character or from vast
hordes of its people crowding in upon us.332
It bears emphasis that the authority to exclude foreigners was not at issue
in the case. As we have seen, the Court had recognized Congress’s
authority to regulate immigration under its commerce power for more than
a half century, and had reaffirmed that framework just five years earlier, in
The Head Money Cases.333 Rather, the passage figures Chinese laborers
not as articles of commerce, but as agents of foreign aggression. In so
doing, Justice Field collapses two essential distinctions: first, between the
Chinese nation “acting in its national character” and “vast hordes” of
Chinese subjects; and second, between alien friends and alien enemies.334
In Justice Field’s formulation, Chinese immigrants’ irredeemable
foreignness displaced the commercial character of the immigration system
as an irreducible premise of the federal immigration power. For all the
discussion of the destructive effects of cheap, servile Chinese labor on
American workers, at bottom the issue was not the regulation of
commerce, but the defense of American sovereignty against foreign
“encroachment” and “aggression”:
[If] the government of the United States . . . considers the
presence of foreigners of a different race in this country, who
will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and
331

Id.
Id. at 606.
333
See supra Part IV.B.
334
The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 606. The construction of Chinese laborers as agents
of foreign aggression defies the basic rule of international law that “aliens are responsible only for . . .
offences in which their nation bears a part,” in which case they become “alien enemies.” The
Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283, 510 (1849) (Daniel, J., dissenting). Not even Justice Field suggests,
however, that Chinese laborers were literally agents of China. Even if Chinese laborers had been
acting as agents of their home government, however, at the time the case was decided the United States
had cordial relations with China, and only nine years earlier had entered into a treaty reaffirming that
Chinese laborers then residing in the United States enjoyed “all the rights, privileges, immunities, and
exemptions which are accorded to the citizens . . . of the most favored nation.” Immigration Treaty of
1880, supra note 322, art. II. Under the law of nations, Chinese laborers were therefore “alien friends,”
however undesirable they may have been to members of Congress or the Justices of the Supreme Court.
332
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security, their exclusion is not to be stayed because at the
time there are no actual hostilities with the nation of which
the foreigners are subjects. The existence of war would
render the necessity . . . only more obvious and pressing.
The same necessity . . . may arise when war does not exist,
and the same authority [applies] . . . . In both cases its
determination is conclusive upon the judiciary.335
As a measure taken to repel foreign aggression, the provision of the Scott
Act voiding Chae Chan Ping’s certificate of reentry was authorized as “an
incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of the United
States.”336 Perhaps most remarkably, Congress’s authority to exclude the
subjects of a nation with which the United States was at peace, and who, at
any rate, were not acting as agents of China, was now identical to
Congress’s power to conduct war. Chinese immigrants’ fundamental
foreignness, marked by their racial difference and failure to assimilate, was
the lynchpin.337
Two years later, in 1891, two interrelated developments confirmed that
this reconstructed, extra-constitutional immigration power was not
confined to congressional efforts to repel the Chinese menace. First,
Congress enacted the Immigration Act of 1891,338 which precluded access
to the federal courts for the mostly European migrants who would be
denied entry by federal immigration inspectors. Second, in Nishimura
Ekiu v. United States,339 the Court upheld the 1891 Act’s virtual
foreclosure of judicial review of administrative immigration decisions.
Justice Gray began his opinion for the Court with a formulation of the
federal immigration power that would serve as a rhetorical and doctrinal
touchstone for the next century:
335

The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 606.
Id. at 609.
337
After reconstructing the immigration power, Justice Field proceeded to retroactively revise the
Court’s rationale in previous decisions upholding Congress’s authority to exclude undesirable classes
of Europeans. “The exclusion of paupers, criminals and persons afflicted with incurable diseases, for
which statutes have been passed,” he wrote, “is only an application of the same power to particular
classes of persons, whose presence is deemed injurious or a source of danger to the country.” Id. at 608.
“[T]here has never been any question as to the power to exclude them,” he continued. “The power is
constantly exercised; its existence is involved in the right of self-preservation.” Id.
338
Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084. The Act modified the existing immigration
framework in three key respects. First, it added “persons likely to become a public charge” to the
previous list of excludable classes. Id. § 1. Second, it assigned exclusive authority to administer the
immigration laws, including the inspection of immigrants, to a national Superintendent of Immigration
lodged within the U.S. Treasury Department. Id. § 7. Third, and most important for the trajectory of
the federal immigration power, it made final decisions of inspection officers “touching the right of any
alien to land” subject to review only by the Superintendent of Immigration and the Secretary of the
Treasury. Id. § 8.
339
142 U.S. 651 (1892).
336
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It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every
sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty,
and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of
foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in
such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to
prescribe. In the United States this power is vested in the
national government, to which the Constitution has
committed the entire control of international relations, in
peace as well as in war.340
This, in a nutshell, is the inherent sovereignty rationale for our
constitutionally exceptional federal immigration power. Justice Gray
proceeded to explain that this power is consigned to the “political
department[s]” of government.341 As he put it, “the decisions of executive
or administrative officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by
Congress, are due process of law.”342 Under the police and commerce
frameworks that prevailed throughout the nineteenth century, the purpose
of the regulation at issue, rather than the identity of those regulated,
determined the nature of the operative authority. Under the inherent
sovereignty model, the bare fact of an immigrant’s non-citizenship
triggered a virtually unrestrained, extra-constitutional authority that was
“conclusive upon the judiciary.”343 Two years later, in Fong Yue Ting v.
United States,344 the Court extended this principle to cover not only the
exclusion of foreigners but also the expulsion of resident aliens.345 There,
the Court declared that “[t]he right to exclude or expel all aliens, or any
class of aliens, absolutely or upon certain conditions, in war or in peace,”
was “an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and independent
nation, essential to its safety, its independence and its welfare.”346

340

Id. at 659 (citations omitted).
Id.
342
Id. at 660. Justice Gray explained:
341

It is not within the province of the judiciary to order that foreigners who have never
been naturalized, nor acquired any domicile or residence within the United States,
nor even been admitted into the country pursuant to law, shall be permitted to enter,
in opposition to the constitutional and lawful measures of the legislative and
executive branches of the national government.
Id.
343

See supra note 335 and accompanying text.
149 U.S. 698 (1893).
345
Id. at 731–32.
346
Id. at 711.
344
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V. CONCLUSION: “SOVEREIGNTY” AND THE CONSTITUTION OF
FOREIGNNESS
When Congress regulates the right of non-citizens to enter or remain
within United States territory, it does so based on an extra-constitutional
authority “inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation.”347 In
this formulation, the constitutional exceptionalism of the federal
immigration power appears almost sui generis—in the words of the
Supreme Court, a timeless “maxim of international law.”348 This Article
challenges this central orthodoxy of modern constitutional immigration law
in two ways.
First, it reveals that the inherent sovereignty rationale came into being
only in the 1880s and 1890s, after a century of constitutionally
unexceptional state and federal authority. Throughout much of the
nineteenth century, the Court figured immigrants not as foreigners, but
simply as persons, whose effect on the health, morals, and welfare of the
community was, like that of other persons, citizens and non-citizens alike,
subject to the police power of the individual states. Even after the Court
redefined immigrants as articles of commerce in the 1870s, it did not
distinguish between human commercial goods transported from a
neighboring state and those transported across an ocean. The Commerce
Clause, like the police power, was indifferent to citizenship. When we
look back at the state police and federal commerce frameworks today, after
more than a century of plenary power, it is striking that the Court found
nothing conceptually distinctive, let alone constitutionally exceptional,
about a statute that regulates foreigners engaged in the process of
immigration. The decidedly unexceptional manner in which the law
operated on foreigners traveling to and landing in the United States defies
the constitutional singularity, so crucial to modern constitutional
immigration law, of a distinct class of “immigration laws” that govern the
admission and removal of foreigners.
Second, and perhaps more fundamentally, the Article denaturalizes the
concept of foreignness that underwrites immigration exceptionalism. For
late-nineteenth century Americans, foreignness came to signify far more
than the absence of citizenship. As wage labor became ascendant in the
post-Civil War era, and as “native” workers confronted increasingly
intense wage competition from recent immigrants, legislators, judges, labor
leaders, and social scientists began to doubt both the regenerative power of
American economic and political culture and, most importantly, the moral
natures of immigrants themselves. Contemporaries concluded that simply
exposing immigrants to republican institutions afforded little value as a
347
348

Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 659.
Id.
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force of assimilation if the requisite economic conditions and racial
material were lacking. As Americans reimagined their polity as a social
and political body, the health of which depended less on the vitality of its
economic and political life than on the collective natural endowments of its
constituent members, foreignness itself became a token of fundamental,
indelible moral difference. The Supreme Court then translated the
discourse of indelible foreignness into a potent and durable rationale for
immigration exceptionalism, forging the immigration power into an
instrument of national “self-preservation” to be deployed against invading
armies of racially degraded, economically and politically unassimilable
foreigners.
Even today, generations after the United States abandoned Chinese
exclusion and national origins quotas, immigrants’ constitutional
estrangement—the principle that foreignness per se rightly dictates the
nature of the authority to which they are subject—remains an axiomatic
feature of the federal immigration power. For modern judicial and
scholarly defenders of immigration exceptionalism, the indecorous rhetoric
that clutters the historical origins of the plenary power doctrine does not
diminish its legal soundness and continued legitimacy. Once we strip
away the Court’s racism and the overwrought metaphor of alien invasion,
the argument runs, there remains, as a logical concomitant of national
sovereignty, an inherent power to govern the admission and expulsion of
non-citizens.
After all, outside of the Naturalization Clause the
Constitution is silent on the federal government’s power to regulate
immigration; but such authority must exist somewhere.
Yet even if one concedes that the principle of territorial sovereignty
implies an authority to govern the right of non-citizens to enter into and
remain within territory, it is unclear why the exercise of such authority also
requires that immigrants be denied important constitutional rights to which
they, as persons, would otherwise be entitled. (Recall that for the fifteen
years preceding the Court’s decision in The Chinese Exclusion Case,
Congress already enjoyed exclusive authority to regulate immigration
under the commerce power.) Why should a body of federal law concerned
overwhelmingly with ordinary matters of labor, economic dependency, and
crime—the issues that dominate the vast majority of immigration
regulation—be “conclusive upon the judiciary”? Why would we consign a
regulatory domain dominated by patently unexceptional subject matter to
the “political branches” of government, where it is buffered against
judicially
enforceable
constitutional
constraints? This Article
demonstrates that it was the very same elements of Justice Field’s opinion
that modern defenders of plenary power would like to dismiss as
anachronistic dicta that enabled the Court to bridge the gaping chasm
between its novel legal rationale for federal authority and the purpose and
subject matter of most immigration lawmaking and enforcement. It was
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precisely immigrants’ fundamental, indelible foreignness—their racial
difference, their inability to assimilate, their destructive effect on American
citizenship—that gave substance to the metaphor of racial invasion, and
thus to the analogy between immigration regulation and war. Indeed, the
tropes of invasion and war allude to Congress’s Article I authority to “repel
Invasions” and “declare war” without strictly invoking them, thus
summoning the tradition of judicial deference that accompanies these
archetypal “political” powers. The Court’s intemperate defense of
American citizenship against invading foreign races cannot, therefore, be
swept aside like some unseemly discursive debris of a bygone era,
cluttering the logically sound foundation of immigration exceptionalism;
rather, it is the cornerstone of the entire edifice.

